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Abstract
This paper develops an agency costs theory of the law of private trusts,
focusing chiefly on donative trusts. The agency costs approach offers fresh
insights into recurring problem areas in trust law including, among others,
trust modification and termination, settlor standing, fiduciary litigation,
trust-investment law and the duty of impartiality, trustee removal, the role of
so-called trust “protectors,” and spendthrift trusts. The normative claim is
that the law of trusts should minimize the agency costs inherent to locating
managerial authority with the trustee and the residual claim with the beneficiaries, but only to the extent that doing so is consistent with the ex ante instructions of the settlor. Accordingly, the use of the private trust triggers a
temporal agency problem (whether the trustee will remain loyal to the
settlor’s original wishes) in addition to the usual agency problem when riskbearing and management are separated (whether the trustee/manager will
act in the best interests of the beneficiaries/residual claimants). The positive
claim is that, at least with respect to trad itional doctrines, the law of trusts
conforms to the suggested normative approach. The paper draws on the ec onomics of the principal -agent problem and the theory of the firm and it engages the ongoing debate about whether trust law is closer to property law or
contract law. The analysis should be amenable to extension in future work to
commercial and charitable trusts.

Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University; Visiting [something] Professor of Law, University of Michigan (Winter 2004). For helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts the au thor
thanks Greg Alexander, Mark Ascher, Jennifer Arlen, Ronen Avraham, Lisa Bernstein, Rick Brooks,
Brian Cheffins, Ronald Chester, Albert Choi, Barry Cushman, Deborah DeMott, Joel Dobris, Frank
Easterbrook, David English, Lee Fennell, Mark Filip, Daniel Fischel, Tamar Frankel, Nicholas
Georgakopoulos, Joshua Getzler, Philip Hamburger, Henry Hansmann, David Hayton, R. H. Helmholz,
Adam Hirsch, Marcel Kahan, John Langbein, Melanie Leslie, James Lindgren, Paul Mahoney, John
McGinnis, Roger Myerson, Richard Nolan, Jeffrey Pennell, James Penner, Eric Posner, Richard Posner,
Claire Priest, Eric Rasmusen, Larry Ribstein, Roberta Romano, Tamara Scheinfeld, Steven Schwarcz,
Samuel Sitkoff, Stewart Sterk, George Triantis, Tom Ulen, Larry Waggoner, Sarah Worthington, Albert
Yoon, and workshop participants at Cambridge, Chicago, [Harvard], [Indiana], London (London School
of Economics and King’s College), Northwestern, Oxford, Virginia, and the Annual Meetings of the
[American (2003),] Midwest (2002), and Canadian (2002) Law and Economics Associations. Richard
Nolan fielded numerous questions about English law. The author also thanks Litsa Georgantopoulos
and Jeremy Sitkoff for excellent research assistance, Kathryn Hensiak for crucial research support, and
the Victor Family Research Fund and the Northwestern University School of Law Summer Faculty
Research Program for financial su pport.
†

-i-

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art13

2

Sitkoff:
September 2, 2003 Draft
89 Cornell L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2004)

Comments Most Welcome
r-sitkoff@law.northwestern.edu

TABLE OF C ONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I.

TRUST LAW AS ORGANIZATIONAL LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
A.
B.
C.
D.

II.

TRUST LAW AS PROPERTY LAW ............................................................................. 5
THE CONTRACTARIAN CHALLENGE ....................................................................... 6
ASSET PARTITIONING AND ORGANIZATIONAL LAW .................................................. 8
THE RISE OF THE MANAGERIAL TRUST.................................................................. 9
ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

A.
B.
C.
III.
A.
B.
C.
D.
IV.

THE THEORY OF THE FIRM ................................................................................. 10
THE ECONOMICS OF AGENCY.............................................................................. 12
AGENCY COSTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS..................................................... 13
THE AGENCY COSTS MODEL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
THE CONTRACTARIAN N EXUS............................................................................. 14
THE OFFICE OF THE TRUSTEE ............................................................................ 16
THE RELATIVE POSITION OF THE SETTLOR .......................................................... 18
BENEFICIARIES AS RESIDUAL CLAIMANTS ........................................................... 20
APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

A.

DONATIVE BENEFICIARIES AS RESIDUAL CLAIMANTS ........................................... 22
1. The duty of impartiality. .................................................................................. 23
2. Total return investing. ..................................................................................... 25
3. Risk tolerance and the duty of care. .................................................................. 27
B.
THE SETTLOR/BENEFICIARY TENSION................................................................. 30
1. Modification and termination. .......................................................................... 30
2. Trustee removal. .............................................................................................. 34
3. Settlor standing. .............................................................................................. 37
4. Trust protectors. .............................................................................................. 39
C.
INTERNAL GOVERNANCE AND EXTERNAL AUTHORITY........................................... 41
1. Equitable tracing. ............................................................................................ 41
2. The spendthrift trust........................................................................................ 43
D. FIDUCIARY LITIGATION ...................................................................................... 46
1. Litigation incentives......................................................................................... 47
2. Fiduciary sub-rules .......................................................................................... 50
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

- ii -

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2003

3

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 13 [2003]

An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law

INTRODUCTION
Agency cost theories of the firm dominate the modern literature of corporate law and economics.1 Meanwhile the private express trust, an entity to
which the corporation traces its roots,2 has been left largely untouched by systematic agency costs analysis.3 Yet in an echo of the famous Berle and Means
critique of the corporation’s “separation of ownership and control,” the centerpiece feature of the private trust as an organizing device for the professional
management of assets is that it “separates the benefits of ownership from the
burdens of ownership.”4 This implies that many of the tools drawn from the
agency cost theories of the firm that are routinely applied in the economic
analysis of corporate law should be similarly applicable to the remarkably underdeveloped economic analysis of trust law.5 Indeed, problems of shirking and
difficulties in monitoring, which is the stuff that drives agency costs analysis,
abounds in trust administration. Accordingly, this paper develops an agency
costs theory of trust law as organizational law, for now focusing on the donative
private trust. The analysis should be amenable to extension in future work to
commercial and charitable trusts.6
Consider a stylized example. In the prototypical gratuitous trust, the
settlor (“S”) in effect contracts with the trustee (“T”) to manage a portfolio of assets in the best interests of the beneficiaries (“B1” and “B2,” collectively the

See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976), reprinted in Michael C. Jensen, Foundations of Organizational Strategy 51, 56-67 & 367 n. 12; Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production,
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777, 778 (1972). The classic exposition in the legal literature is Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law (1991). See also Symposium: Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law , 89 Colum. L. Rev.
1395-1774 (1989); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L.
& Econ. 301 (1983); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jense n, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.
L. & Econ. 327 (1983); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pol. Econ.
288 (1980). See generally Stephen Bainbridge, Corporate Law and Economics 26- 38 (2002).
1

See Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and Interdo ctrinal Legal Transplants , 96 Nw. L. Rev. 651, 655-57 (2002); Joseph T. Walsh, The Fiduciary Foundation of Corporate Law , 27 J. Corp. L. 333, 333-35 (2002). See also Frederic Maitlan d, Trust and Corporation, in III H. A. L. Fisher, The Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland 321, 395 (1911).
2

Prior systemic applications of agency costs analysis to trust law are scarce. Notable exceptions include
A.I. Ogus, The Trust as Governance Structure, 36 U. Toronto L. J. 186 (1986); Jonathan Macey, Private
Trusts for the Provision of Private Goods, 37 Emory L. J. 295, 315-21 (1988). This is not to say, however, that agency costs analysis has not informed occasional specific analyses. See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch
& William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 Ind. L. J. 1, 28-29 (1992); Adam J.
Hirsch, Trusts for Purposes: Policy, Amb iguity, and Anomaly in the Uniform Laws, 26 Fla. St. U. L.
Rev. 913, 928 (1999).
3

Compare Adolph A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932),
with Austin W. Scott, I Scott on Trusts § 1, p. 2 (4th ed. 1987) [hereafter “Scott on Trusts”].
4

See Ogus, supra note __, at 186 (1986) (noting the “n eglect” of the trust by the law -and-economics
movement); Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and
Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 434, 435 (1998) (same).
5

On extensions to charitable trusts, see infra notes 179, 233, 293 and text accompanying. On exte nsions to commercial trusts, see infra notes 12-13, 145, 289-292 and text accompanying.
6
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“Bs”), subject to the ex ante restraints imposed by the settlor.7 Hence, using the
vocabulary of agency in economic rather than legal parlance, T can be viewed as
the agent of S; but T can also be viewed as the agent of B1 and B2. To the extent that T might slight or ignore what S would have wanted in the ongoing
management of the trust, we have a problem of agency costs in the S/T relationship. But to the extent that T might slight or ignore what B1 and B2 want in
the ongoing management of the trust, we have the usual agency problem when
risk-bearing (here by B1 and B2) is separated from management (here by T). So
where the corporate form presents one dominant source of agency costs (the
shareholder/manager relationship), the trust presents two. This difference is
crucial, because it means that even if the vocabulary for the economic analysis of
trust law will be similar to that of the economic analysis of corporate law, the
underlying analyses will be different. Given the trust’s independent donative
transfer, commercial transaction, and capital markets significance,8 this should
not be surprising.
That S saddled his or her transfer to B1 and B2 with the friction of competing principal-agent relationships is the core insight that animates the agency
costs analysis. The paper’s normative claim is that the law of private trusts
should minimize the agency costs inherent to locating managerial authority
with the trustee (T) and the residual claim with the beneficiaries (B1 and B2),
but only to the extent that doing so is consistent with the ex ante instructions of
the settlor (S). This qualification gives priority to the settlor over the beneficiaries as the trustee’s primary principal.9 The positive claim is that, at least with
respect to traditional doctrines,10 the law conforms to the suggested normative
approach.11

See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 Yale L. J. 625 (1995). See
also Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American Trust Law at Century’s End, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1881, 1881 (2000).
7

See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, Trust Law in the United States. A Basic Study of Its Special Contribution, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 133, 133 (1998); sources cited in infra note 13.
8

In a sense, this paper is a (long) answer to the question posed in William T. Allen & Reiner Kraakman,
Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organizations § 2.3.3, p. 38 (2003), “If the trustee relationship is analogized to the agency relationship, whom should we view as the princ ipal?” See also id.
at 36. Note, however, that under traditional doctrine the settlor, even if living, cannot e nforce the terms
of the trust (see infra Part IV.B.3)—hence the length of the answer.
9

Analysis of modern reforms such as asset protection trusts, see Stewart Sterk, Asset Prote ction
Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1035 (2000) [hereafter Sterk, APT], and the
abrogation of the rule against perpetuities, see Note, Dynasty Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities,
116 Harv. L. Rev 2588; Stewart E. Sterk, Juris dictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against
Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 2097 (2003) [hereafter Sterk, RAP]; Joel C. Dobris
The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or the RAP Has No Friends: An Essay, 35 Real Prop. Prob.
& Tr. J. 601 (2000); Angela M. Vallario, Death By A Thousand Cuts: The Rule Against Perpetu ities, 25
J. Legis. 141 (1999), requires not only agency costs analysis but also reference to their political
economies and the dynamics of the domestic and international regulatory competition in private trust
law. See Robert H. Sitkoff & Jonathan Corsico, Follow the Money: The Domestic and Offshore
Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Business (work-in-progress on file with the au thor).
10

This paper is therefore in some tension with Macey, supra note __, though this tension is more appa rent than real. For a variety of institutional reasons that are lucidly canvassed in Jeffrey N. Gordon,
11
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Theoretical and practical payoffs to the agency costs approach abound.
On the theoretical side, it points to a further research agenda for the economic
analysis of trust law. Beneficiaries assume the role of risk-bearing “residual
claimants” (or at least they do in the context of donative trusts),12 and important
questions for research include the following: When and why do ind ividuals
choose to organize their relationships—both commercial and donative—by reference to the law of trusts rather than some other branch of organizational law?13
What is the private trust’s default governance arrangement, and why? Does the
law do a good job of supplying the terms that the relevant parties would have
bargained for with full information and low negotiation costs and, for that matter, who are the relevant parties? What is the role of markets—including labor,
product, and capital markets14—in all this? Because trust law is chiefly state
law, is there a regulatory competition among them, and if so, to what end?15
On the practical side, agency costs analysis offers fresh insights into recurring problem areas in the law of private trusts including, among others, trust
modification and termination, settlor standing, fiduciary litigation, trustinvestment law and the duty of impartiality, trustee removal, the role of socalled trust “protectors,” and spendthrift trusts. Moreover, on several of these
and other issues American and English trust law diverge, so a further payoff of
the agency costs approach is that it provides a framework for evaluating the
competing Anglo-American views.
The paper is organized as follows. Part I situates the analysis within the
current literature of trust law. More specifically, it advances the claim that
classifying trust law as organizational law and subjecting it to agency costs
analysis is the logical next step in the nascent economic analysis of the private
express trust. Thus, this paper does not advance the inherently dubious claim
that all prior approaches to the trust should be discarded. To the contrary, the
insights developed within the debate about whether trust law is closer to con-

The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule , 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev 52 (1987), the evolution towards efficiency in trust law reflects a blend of common law and statutory reform. For further
discussion, see Sitkoff & Corsico, supra note __.
See infra Parts III.D., IV.A. The parenthetical qualification is necessary because in contrast to the
typical settlor of a gratuitous trust, “the settlor in a commercial trust almost always retains a residual
interest.” Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: Unraveling the Mystery,
58 Bus. Law. 559, 562 (2003).
12

See generally Schwarcz, supra note __, at 560, 573-84; Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __, at 473-78;
John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 Yale L.
J. 165, 189 (1997). See also Michael Bryan, Reflections on Some Commercial Applications of the Trust,
in Ian Ramsay, ed., Key Developments in Corporate Law and Trusts Law 205-26 (2002). See also Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations, __ Duke J. Comp. & Int. L. __ (forthcoming 2003). In particular the trust plays a critical role as a special purpose entity in structured finance transactions. See, e.g., Schwarcz, at 564-65; Edward M. Iacobucci & Ralph A. Winter, Asset Securitization and Asymmetric Information (manuscript).
13

See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J. Corp. L. __
(forthcoming 2003).
14

15

See Sterk, APT, supra note __; Sterk, RAP, supra note __; Sitkoff & Corsico, supra note __.
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tract law or property law point to the viability of the agency costs approach.16 In
Part II, the paper briefly reviews the agency cost theories of the firm and the
economics of the principal-agent problem. Both underpin the paper’s agency
costs approach to trust law. Part III identifies and then illuminates through
agency costs analysis the key relationships between the parties who have an interest in the trust property and/or its management. Finally, Part IV develops
the paper’s positive and normative claims with reference to illustrative trust law
doctrines including, but not limited to, the recurring issues mentioned in the
prior paragraph. In so doing, Part IV helps to illuminate some of the endogenous governance considerations relevant to the initial choice to make use of
trust law rather than some other branch of organizational law.17
I.

TRUST LAW AS ORGANIZATIONAL LAW

This Part advances the claim that the law of trusts blends property lawlike and contract law-like features. Hence trust law is properly classified and
best understood as organizational law. This Part may therefore be situated
within the discourse over whether trust law is more closely related to contract
law or property law. Early participants in this debate, which has been ongoing
for over 100 years, include Frederic Maitland (who took a contractarian perspective), Austin Scott (who took a proprietary perspective), and Harlan Fiske Stone
(another contractarian).18 More recently, the discussion has been reenergized
and infused with greater economic sophistication by John Langbein and by
Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei.19
The ensuing agency costs analysis owes some of its stimulation to a pair of recent art icles, the first by
John Langbein and the second by Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei. See Langbein, supra note __;
Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __. See also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential
Role of Organizational Law , 110 Yale L. J. 387, 416 (2000); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The
Property/Contract Interface, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 773, 843-49 (2001); Ogus, supra note __. Its more general inspiration is the nexus of contracts models of the firm. See sources cited in su pra note 1; infra
Part II.
16

The paper puts the exogenous tax features of the private trust to the side (they are exogenous in that
they stem from the tax code rather than trust law). For discussion, see Edward Halbach, The Uses and
Purposes of Trusts in the United States, in David Hayton, ed., Modern International Develo pments in
Trust Law 123-43, at 139-42 (1999). Thus, the ensuing analysis for the most part will not address exogenous variables that are admittedly relevant to the choice between organizational forms such as their
differing tax and bankruptcy treatments. For discussion with respect to commercial trusts, see Langbein, supra note __, at 180-81; Schwarcz, supra note __, at 581.
17

On the Maitland/Scott “dialogue,” see Langbein, supra note __, at 644-46 (collecting and describing
their publications). See also Harlan F. Stone, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17
Colum. L. Rev. 467 (1917).
19 For modern American manifestations, see Langbein, supra note __; Hansmann & Mattei, supra note
__; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note __; Merrill & Smith, supra note __, at 844 & n. 248; Joel C.
Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust at the New Millennium, or, We Don’t Have to
Think of England Anymore, 62 Alb. L. Rev. 543, 546-48 (1998); Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand
and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1189, 1196-97 & n. 13 (1985). See
also Philbrick, su pra note __, at 151; Richard Powell, Powell on Real Property ¶ 513[3], at pp. 41-142
(1995). For modern English manifestations, see David Hayton, Developing the Obligation Characteristic of the Trust, 117 L. Q. Rev. 96, 107-08 (2001); Paul Ma tthews, From Obligation to Property, and
Back Again? The Future of the Non-Charitable Pu rpose Trust, in Hayton, supra note __, at 203-41;
George Gretton, Trusts Without Equity, 49 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 599, 603-08 (2000); Joshua Getzler, Leg18
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A. Trust Law as Property Law
In accord with the views of Scott,20 the law of trusts is most frequently
classified as a species of property law. The 1959 Restatement (Second) of
Trusts, for example, characterizes the “creation of a trust . . . as a conveyance of
the beneficial interest in the trust property rather than as a contract.”21 Likewise Gregory Alexander recently distinguished the trustee’s fiduciary obligation
from those of corporate and other fiduciaries on the ground that the fiduciary
relationship in trust law is “property-based.”22 In England, moreover, a leading
treatise suggests that the law of trusts “is at the heart of the common law of
property,”23 and the just-finalized (2003) first two volumes of the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts retain the view of the Second Restatement that the stake of the
beneficiaries is in the nature of a property interest.24
For developing a functional understanding of trust law, however, merely
classifying it as property law, without a functional analysis of the trust’s proprietary or in rem features, is unsatisfying.25 To be sure, the existence of specifically identified property (the trust res) is necessary for trust formation.26 But
islative incursions into modern trusts doctrine in England: The Trustee Act 2000 and the Contracts
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, 2 Glob. Jur. Top. Art. 2 (2002); Joshua Getzler, Patterns of Fusion
164-65, in Peter Birks, ed., The Classification of Obligations 157-92 (1997); Neil Jones, Trusts in England after the Statute of Uses 192-96, in Richard Helmholz & Reinhard Zimmermann (eds.), Intinera
Fiduciae: Trust and Treuhand in Historical Perspective 173 (1998); Michael Macnair, The Conceptual
Basis of Trusts in the Later 17th and Early 18th Centuries 221-29, in id. at 207; Richard Edwards,
Trusts and Equity 16-29 (5th ed. 2002); Graham Mo ffat, Trusts Law —Texts and Materials 190-95 (3d
ed 1999); Richard Nolan, Property in a Fund (manuscript). See also Patrick Parkinson, Reconceptuali sing the Express Trust, 61 Camb. L. J. 657 (2002); Stefan Grundmann, The Evolution of Trust and Treuhand in the 20th Century 471- 78, in Helmholz & Zimmermann, supra, at 470; C.E.F. Rickett, The Cla ssification of Trusts, 18 N. Z. U. L. Rev. 305 (1999); Gregory S. Alexander, The Transformation of Trusts
as a Legal Category, 5 L. & Hist. Rev. 303, 322-50 (1987); Joel C. Dobris, Stewart E. Sterk, & Melanie
B. Leslie, Estates and Trusts 476-77 (2d ed. 2003); Elias Clark, et. al., Gratuitous Transfers: Wills, Intestate Succession, Trusts, Gifts, Future Inte rests, and Estate and Gift Taxation 454-56 (4th ed. 1999).
See Langbein, supra note __, at 643-46. See also Eugene F. Scoles, Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Ronald C.
Link, & Patricia Gilchrist Roberts, Problems and Materials on Decedents’ Estates and Trusts 605-06
(6th ed. 2000); Parkinson, supra note __, at 657-58.
20

Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 197 cmt. b (emphasis added). See Langbein, supra note __, at 64849.
21

Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Rela tionships, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 767, 768 & n.
7 (2000). See also Getzler, supra note __, at 10-14 (similar analysis by an English trust scholar). But
see Sitkoff, supra note __ (comparing the fiduciary obligation in corporate and trust law).
22

23

Robert Pearce & John Stevens, The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations v (3d ed. 2002).

24

See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 5(i) & cmt. i.

See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __, at 435-38 (“While there is an extensive legal literature on the
institution of the trust, that literature—whether domestic or comparative in focus—tends to be do ctrinal rather than broadly functional in perspective.”). See also Langbein, supra note __, at 643-66;
Sarah Worthington, The Commercial Utility of the Trust Vehicle, in David Hayton, ed., Extending the
Boundaries of Trusts and Sim ilar Ring- Fenced Funds 135 (2002).
25

Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 74; II Scott on Trusts § 74, pp. 428-32. See also Jane B. Baron, The
Trust Res and Donative Intent, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 45 (1986). This is an important difference between the
trust and, say, a life insurance contract. The insurance company, unlike a trustee, is not required to
segregate any assets. See, e.g., Jesse Dukeminier & Stanley M. Johanson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates
332 n. 2 (6th ed. 2000).
26
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continuing to deem trust law to be a species of property law for that reason,27 or
to do so because of the private trust’s origin in the conveyance of land, obscures
not only the trust’s proprietary functions, but also trust law’s highly enabling,
elastic, flexible, and default nature with respect to its in personam relations. As
Scott’s famous treatise observes, “The duties of the trustee are such as the creator of the trust may choose to impose; the interests of the beneficiaries are such
as he may choose to confer upon them.”28
Accordingly, the task for the functional study of trust law should be to
identify its in rem proprietary elements and then to understand how they have
been blended over time with the trust’s in personam contractarian elements.
For as Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have recently observed, the modern
law of trusts offers many of the in rem benefits of property law while at the
same time offers much of the in personam flexibility of contract law.29
B. The Contractarian Challenge
In an important recent article, John Langbein offered a functional account of the law of trusts that challenged the received wisdom of trust law as
property law by contending that trust law’s contractarian elements predominate. To Langbein, “the deal between settlor and trustee is functionally indistinguishable from the modern third-party-beneficiary contract. Trusts are contracts.”30 In comparison to the meaning of “contractarian” as that term is used
in the literature of corporate law and economics, however, Langbein’s contractarian approach is more closely allied with the law of contracts than with the
“nexus of contracts” metaphor that informs the agency cost theories of the
firm.31 On this view, the basis for the rights and remedies of the beneficiary as
against the trustee, which is to say the law of trust governance, might be reckoned for expositional purposes as a third-party beneficiary contract between the
settlor and trustee.32
See II Scott on Trusts § 74, pp. 429-30; Parkinson, supra note __, at 658-59, 663-67; Rickett, supra
note __, at 308-09. See also Baron, supra note __, at 51-54. Cf. Langbein, su pra note __, at 627.
27

28

I Scott on Trusts § 1, p. 2. See also Halbach, supra note __, at 133.

See Merrill & Smith, supra note __, at 843-49. See also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31
J. Legal Stud. S373, S375 (2002). Cf. Hayton, supra note __, at 107-08; Francis S. Philbrick, Property
10, 150-60 (1939).
29

Langbein, supra note __, at 627. See also Parkinson, supra note __, at 659, 676-82 (suggesting “that
the law of trusts is better conceptualised as a species of obligation rather than being unde rstood as a
form of property ownership”).
30

Compare Langbein, supra note __, at 627, with Bainbridge, supra note __, at 27-28 (“As used by contractarians, however, the term is not limited to those relationships that constitute legal contracts.”);
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. Corp. L. 819, 822-23 (1999). See also infra Part II.C; sources cited in supra note
1.
31

See Langbein, supra note __, at 650. One might think of the rights and duties imposed by the trust
instrument as stemming not from the law of trusts but rather from the law of the trust. Cf. E. Allan
Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.1, pp. 425-26 (3d ed. 1999).
32
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Langbein’s analysis implies that trust law’s role is to offer a set of standardized terms that minimize transaction costs for the deal between the settlor
and the trustee. By invoking the law of trusts, the settlor and the trustee need
only record the extent to which their deal deviates from the default governance
regime.33 This view has two important normative implications. First, trust
law’s default governance regime, including most critically the fiduciary obligation of the trustee to the beneficiaries,34 should reflect the terms for which the
parties would likely have bargained with low negotiation costs and full information. Second, courts should employ an intention-seeking approach on questions
of interpretation.35 Thus, with respect to matters of internal trust governance,
Langbein demonstrates both the positive and the normative power of the sort of
hypothetical bargain analysis that is familiar from contract and corporate law
and econo mics.36
For purposes of understanding the relevance of trust law to the dealings
of the trusts’ principal parties with outsiders, however, the model of the trust as
functionally equivalent to a third-party beneficiary contract runs into trouble.
The problem is that in the usual third-party beneficiary contract, the rights of
the parties and third-party beneficiaries to the contract do not implicate the
rights of other nonparties to the deal. But regulating the relationships with
outsiders of the trust’s insiders (the trustee, the beneficiaries, and the settlor) is
a key feature of trust law, one that implicates something of an in rem dynamic.37
This includes the law of trustee insolvency (an exceedingly rare phenomenon in
donative trusts but an important consideration for commercial trusts);38 spendthrift trusts (the more common problem of beneficiary insolvency);39 equitable
tracing principles;40 and the continuity of the office of the trustee despite tur n-

33

See Langbein, supra note __, at 660-63. See also Ogus, supra note __, at 206-07.

34

See infra Part IV.D.

35

See infra note 106 and text accompanying.

Langbein, supra note __, at 630, 663-64. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L. J. 87, 89-91 (1989) (collecting illustrative examples).
36

This is the important contribution of Hansmann & Ma ttei, supra note __. See also Hansmann & Kr aakman, supra note __; Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __. For discussion and references see infra Part
I.C.
37

Langbein himself called the law of trustee insolvency “the weak point of contractarian analysis.”
Langbein, supra note __, at 667-69. See also Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __, at 454-61, 469-72;
Merrill & Smith, supra note __, at 846-47; Getzler, supra note __, at 12-13. On the relevance of inso lvency to commercial trusts, see Schwarcz, supra note __, at 581.
38

See generally Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 149-62; infra Part IV.B.2. Although the law of contracts sometimes allows the promisee (the role played by the settlor in Langbein’s model) to disable the
third- party beneficiary from assigning his or her chose in action to another, see Farnsworth, supra note
__, at § 11.4, pp. 717-18, it does not allow for the promisee to disable the third- party benefic iary from
alienating that chose in action to both voluntary and involuntary creditors. See Hansmann & Ma ttei,
supra note __, at 452-53 & n. 58. Cf. David M. English, Is There A Uniform Trust Act in Your Future,
Prob. & Prop. 25, 30 (Janu ary/February 2000).
39

40

See infra Part IV.B.1.
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over in its occupant.41 Explanation of these features requires acknowledgement
of trust law’s proprietary features. Thus, as Langbein concluded, “Trust is a hybrid of contract and property, and acknowledging contractarian elements does
not require disregarding property components whose conve nience abides.”42
C. Asset Partitioning and Organizational Law
In a subsequent article that revisited the functional relevance of trust
law’s proprietary features, Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei argued “that it is
precisely the property-like aspects of the trust that are the principal contribution of trust law.”43 This is not to say that they have taken up the mantle of
Austin Scott. To the contrary, they “agree with Langbein that, so far as the relationships between the settlor, the trustee, and the beneficiary are concerned,
trust law adds very little to contract law.”44 Rather, they argued that the important contribution of trust law is its ability “to facilitate an accompanying organization of rights and responsibilities between the three principal parties [i.e., the
settlor, the trustee, and the beneficiary] and third parties, such as creditors,
with whom the principal parties deal.”45 By this Hansmann and Mattei refer in
particular to “the use of trust law to shield trust assets from claims of the trustee’s personal creditors.”46
So Hansmann and Mattei’s contribution—which might be understood as
a specific application of a later, more general project by Hansmann and Reinier
Kraakman47—was to stress the importance of trust law’s extraordinary “asset
partitioning” function. That is, the law of trusts allows the trustee to deal separately with creditors of the trust property from creditors of his or her own personal property. With respect to all creditors, the law of trusts in effect (though

See infra Part III.B. In fairness, however, many contracts provide for assumption or assig nment to
deal with the turnover problem. See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note __, at ch. 11.
41

42

Langbein, supra note __, at 669.

43

Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __, at 469.

44

Id. at 470.

Id. at 472, 451-64. The text above should not be read, however, as an embrace of their overstatement
that “organizational law is much more important as property law than as contract law,” Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra note __, at 390, or that “[ p]rivately prepared standard form contracts” could match
the drafting efficiencies of the present system of public provision of default rules for trust governance.
Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __, at 448-49. True, in the absence of trust law the parties could incorporate the language of the Restatement’s fiduciary provisions into their deal. See Hansmann & Mattei,
supra note __, at 448. But the viability of that approach depends on the existence of ample judicial exegesis of the Restatement’s text. Precedent is a public good, and the terms of a privately prepared contract can be duplicated by anyone. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note __, at 35. See also Marcel
Kahan and Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 Va. L. Rev. 713 (1997); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and
Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757 (1995).
45

46

Id. at 438, 451-64.

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note __, at 414-17. See also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note __,
at S405-07.
47
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not formally, at least not yet48) splits the trustee into “two distinct legal persons:
a natural person contracting on behalf of himself, and an artificial person acting
on behalf of the beneficiaries.”49 This creation of “two distinct legal persons”
could not feasibly be reproduced with explicit contracting.50 Thus asset partitioning represents an important difference between organizational forms and
simple contractual arrangements.51 The former have an external proprietary or
in rem dimension that complements their internal contractarian or in personam
features.
By giving a functional explanation for and a specific identification of the
essential proprietary dimension of trust law, the Hansmann and Mattei project
may be harmonized with Lanbein’s contractarian approach. Taken together,
they show that the law of trusts, like the law of other organizations, offers a nice
blending of in rem and in personam features. And this implies that, going forward, the study of the law of private trusts should more closely resemble the
study of other organizational forms,52 an endeavor in which agency costs analysis abounds.
D. The Rise of the Managerial Trust
Further support for treating the law of trusts as organizational law
stems from the empirical observation that the use of the private trust in modern
practice has come increasingly to resemble the use of other organizational
forms. As Langbein and others have shown, owing to the liberalization of testamentary freedom, the lifting of feudal restrictions on land transfer, and the
shift in modern wealth away from land,53 the private trust has evolved from a
vehicle for conveying and preserving ancestral land into an organizing device
that allows owners of property to ensure the ongoing and intergenerational professional management of their wealth.54 In other words, in addition to classic
but still relevant context-specific rationales such as minimizing taxes and asset
See Halbach, supra note __, at 1882-83 (“Without abandoning the basic definition of a trust as a fiduciary relationship, there appear to be subtle but practically significant departures from the concept that
a trust is not an entity.”); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 2 cmt. a & Reporter’s Notes thereto. See also
Tatarian v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 672 N.E.2d 997, 1000 (Mass. App. 1996) (analogizing the
trust to a corporation and treating the trust as a separate entity). Cf. Schwarcz, su pra note __, at 57475.
48

49

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note __, at 416.

50

See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __, at 466.

51

See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note __.

For a specific application of this general point, see Richard W. Painter, Contracting Around Conflicts
in a Family Representation: Louis Brandeis and the Warren Trust, 8 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 353,
367-69 (2001).
52

See Moffat, supra note __, at 37 (“The significance for trusts law of this shift in the nature of family
wealth-holdings—that is, from land (predominantly) to investment assets as well as land—can scarcely
be overstated.”). See also John H. Langbein, The Twentieth -Century Revolution in Family Wealth
Transmission, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 722 (1988).
53

See, e.g., Langbein, supra note __, at 632-43; Moffat, supra note __, at 24-33. Cf. Halbach, supra note
__, at 133- 36.
54
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protection, the donative trust today is also used more generally to bring together
portfolio management skills with investment cap ital.
Thus, the use of professional fiduciaries is on the rise.55 The default
rules governing trust investment now require something of a total return investment strategy consistent with modern portfolio theory. 56 The fiduciary obligation has eclipsed limitations on the trustee’s powers as the primary governance tool for aligning the interests of the trustee, who in the modern private
trust is vested with vast discretion, with the interests of the beneficiaries.57 All
of this militates towards the view that, going forward, the study of the law of
trusts should more closely resemble the study of other organizational forms. As
we shall see, this is perhaps clearest with respect to the problem of agency costs
in the modern managerial trust.
II.

ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS

For those unfamiliar with the economics of the principal-agent problem
or the agency cost theories of the firm that the principal-agent problem underpins, this Part offers a brief overview. The goal is to provide context for the application of these ideas in Parts III and IV to the gratuitous private express
trust.
A. The Theory of the Firm
In his 1937 essay, “The Nature of the Firm,” Ronald Coase endeavored to
understand why some economic activity took place within firms rather than in
open market transactions.58 Coase’s insight was that such activity would be organized within firms when the expected costs of allocating resources by internal
direction were less than the expected transaction costs of undertaking the same
activity in an open market transaction.59 Coase’s contribution was therefore to
demonstrate the salience of transaction costs. From this beginning at least
three different though complementary modern approaches to the theory of the
firm have evolved.
“Private trustees still abound, but the prototypical modern trustee is the fee-paid professional, whose
business is to enter into and carry out trust agreements.” Langbein, su pra note __, at 638. See also
Alexander, supra note __, at 774-75 (“Today, the vast majority of trusts are administered by large financial institutions, such as trust companies and trust developments of commercial banks.”); Peering into
Trust Industry Archives, 115 Tr. & Est. 452 (1976). Several readers of earlier drafts questioned the
empirical basis for this claim, which warrants further investigation. See Sitkoff, supra note __, at __.
The specific point, however, is not critical to the ensuing agency costs analysis, and this e mpirical study
is a project for another day.
55

See infra Part IV.A.2.
See Langbein, supra note __, at 638-43. See also John H. Langbein, The Uniform Trust Code:
Codific ation of the Law of Trusts in the United States, 15 Tr. L. Int’l 66, 71 (2001).
56
57

R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica (n.s.) 386 (1937), reprinted in R.H. Coase, The
Firm, the Market, and the Law 3 3-55 (1988). For a general introduction, see Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 Colum L. Rev. 1757 (1989).
58

59

Coase, supra note __, at 38
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The transaction costs approach, which is most closely associated with
Oliver Williamson and is probably the most direct descendent of Coase’s essay,
focuses on the boundary between the firm and the market.60 Property rights
theories of the firm, in contrast, are “very much in the spirit of the transaction
cost literature of Coase and Williamson, but differ by focusing attention on the
role of physical, that is, nonhuman, assets in a contractual relationship.”61 The
core relationships that aggregate into the trust as an organizational form, ho wever, are for the most part open-market transactions rather than intra-firm
transfers.62 So ne ither the transaction costs nor the property rights approaches
appear as immediately relevant to the present project as the agency cost the ories.
Agency cost theories of the firm, which owe their origin to papers by Alchian and Demsetz and by Jensen and Meckling, model organizations as webs of
express, implied, and metaphorical contracts among individuals with conflicting
interests, all of which revolve around an organizing legal construct.63 So the key
insight of this so-called “nexus of contracts” approach was to demonstrate the
importance of principal -agent economics for the study of organizations. As Jensen and Meckling put it, “Many problems associated with the inadequacy of the
current theory of the firm can also be viewed as special cases of the theory of
agency relationships, in which there is a growing literature.” 64 Hence, the
agency cost theories of the firm focus on the problems of shirking and monitoring that stem from information asymmetries within the organization’s comp onent relationships. A brief review of the economics of agency is therefore in order.65

See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting (1985).
60

Hart, supra note __, at 1765 & n. 32. See Stanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and
Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and lateral Integration, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 691 (1986); Oliver
Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1119 (1990).
61

62

See Rock & Wactler, supra note __, at 664-66.

63

Alchian & Demsetz, supra note __, at 778; Jensen & Meckling, supra note __, at 56, 367 n. 12.

Jensen & Meckling, supra note __, at 53-54. See also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & Econ. 301 (1983); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the
Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288 (1980).
64

For accessible and relatively nonmathematical introductions to principal-agent mode ling, see Hal R.
Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach 667-88 (6th ed. 2003); Kenneth J. Arrow,
The Economics of Agency, in John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, eds., Principles and Agents: The
Structure of Business 37-51 (1985). See also Kathleen M. Eise nhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment
and Review, 14 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 57 (1989). For accessible formal introductions, see Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, supra note __, at 477-510 (1995); Hal R. Varian, Microeconomic Analysis 440-71 (3d ed.
1992); David M. Kreps, A course in microeconomic theory 577-719 (1990); Jean-Jacques Laffont & David
Martimort, The Theory of Inventives: The Principal-Agent Model (2002). Important scholarly statements include Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem, 63 Am. Econ.
Rev. 134 (1973); Steven Shavell, Risk sharing and incentives in the principal and agent relatio nship, 10
Bell J. Econ. 55 (1979); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, 51 Econometrica 7 (1983). For a basic discussion of the applicability of principal-agent modeling to
legal problems, see Eric A. Posner, Agency Models in Law and Economics, in Eric A. Posner, ed., Ch icago Lectures in Law and Economics 225 (2000).
65

- 11 -

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art13

14

Sitkoff:

An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law

B. The Economics of Agency
Using the vocabulary of agency in economic rather than legal parlance,66
agency problems are caused by the impossibility of complete contracting when
one party (the agent) has discretionary and unobservable decision-making authority that affects the wealth of another party (the principal). When the
agent’s effort is unobservable, ex post enforcement of the ex ante bargain, no
matter how detailed it may be, is impractical. The problem is that the principal
will be unable to ascertain whether a disappointing result was caused by the
agent’s breach or an exogenous factor. Thus, unless there is a perfect correlation
between the agent’s effort and the project’s observable profits, in which case a
good or bad return would conclusively show the level of the agent’s effort,67 it
will be difficult for the principal to prevent shirking by the agent. This is the
problem of “hidden action,” sometimes called “moral hazard.”68 The problem is
one of post-contractual asymmetric information.69
Consider, for example, “a real estate agent on a 5 percent commission.”70
Assuming the principal cannot feasibly monitor the agent’s day-to-day activities,
the agent has no incentive to “undertake even $10 worth of effort to improve the
realized price by $100, because the agent reaps only $5 of this sum.” But this
$10 of additional effort would have been in the principal’s best interests. If the
parties’ interests were perfectly aligned (as would be the case if the agent were
selling his or her own property), then the agent would have undertaken the effort. The agent’s failure to do so leads to a welfare loss. True, the divergence in
this example is an artifact of the 5 percent commission, and a higher commission of say, 15 percent, would have solved the problem here. But no compensation scheme short of transferring complete ownership of the project to the agent
will solve the incentive problem when the agent’s efforts are unobservable.
The losses to the parties that stem from such a misalignment of interests
are called agency costs. The Jensen and Meckling definition is ubiquitous in the
legal literature: “Agency costs” refers to the sum of the costs of the princ ipal’s
“monitoring efforts,” the costs of the agent’s “bonding efforts,” and the “residual
The difference is that a principal-agent relationship in law requires a showing of control. See Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 1; Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 & cmt. c (T.D. No. 2, a pproved
2001). Cf. Allen & Kraakman, supra note __, at § 2.3.3, p. 36.
66

See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and
Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1045, 1049-51 (1991); Mas-Colell, Whin ston, & Green, supra
note __, at 478-79.
67

68

See Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, supra note __, at 477 n. 1.

69

A nice statement may be found at Laffont & Marimort, supra note __, at 3 (emphasis in orig inal):
The starting point of incentive theory corresponds to the problem of delega ting a task to
an agent with private information. This private information can be of two types: e ither
the agent can take an action unobserved by the principal, the case of moral hazard or
hidden action; or the agent has some private knowledge about his cost or valuation that
is ignored by the principal, the case of adverse selection or hidden knowledge.

This illustration is taken from Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note __, at 91. See also Posner, supra
note __, at 225-29.
70

- 12 -

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2003

15

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 13 [2003]

An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law

loss” as measured by the “dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare experienced by the principal as a result of” the divergence in the principal’s and the
agent’s interests.71 In the foregoing example the lost $100 increase in the sale
price would count as residual loss.
C. Agency Costs and Organizational Forms
Returning to the agency cost theories of the firm, the arresting insight of
Jensen and Meckling’s nexus of contracts model was to show that the study of
organizational forms involves more concretely the study of clusters or webs of
discrete principal-agent relationships.72 Accordingly, subsequent research has
explored the effectiveness of various devices, legal and otherwise, at minimizing
agency costs within different organizational forms; and this literature has
thrown light on the governance features that help distinguish different organizational forms from each other.73 In particular, the literature of enterprise organizations has explored managerial labor markets,74 incentive compensation,75
alienable residual claims,76 flexible sharing rules and mutual monitoring,77 the
market for corporate control (i.e., the takeover market),78 disclosure rules,79 and
liability rules such as fiduciary duties,80 as devices for minimizing agency costs.
The private express trust has not been similarly subjected to systematic
agency costs analysis.81

71

Jensen & Meckling, supra note __, at 53-55.

72

See supra notes 63-64 and text accompanying.

See, e.g., Fama & Jensen, supra note __, at 311-21; Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 103 (1985). Cf. Ogus, supra note __, at 195.
73

74

See, e.g., Fama, supra note __, at 295.

See Tod Perry and Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 123 (2000); Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation,
in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, eds., Handbook of Labo r Economics 2485 (1999); Symposium on
Management Compensation and the Managerial Labor Market, 7 J. Acct. & Econ. (1985). See also
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried, & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751 (2002).
75

76

See, e.g., Fama & Jensen, supra note __, at 332-33.

77

See id. at 335-37 (discussing professional partnerships).

See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110 (1965);
Symposium on the Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. Fin. Econ. (1983); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The
Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 973 (2002).
78

See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1047 (1995); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection
of Investors, 70 Va. L. Rev. 669 (1984).
79

See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivat ive Suit in
Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 261 (1986); sources cited in
infra note __.
80

81

See supra note __.
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III.

THE AGENCY COSTS MODEL

In comparison to the agency costs approach to corporate law,82 the agency
costs approach to trust law will be both simpler and more complex. It is in some
respects simpler, because the trust is a less complicated organization. This
makes the agency costs analysis and reckoning the hypothetical bargain of the
principal parties easier. In other respects it is more complicated, however, because the actions of the ind ividuals interested in the trust are not metered by
price signals from efficient capital markets.83 Moreover, the law regularly subordinates the interests of the beneficiaries as residual clai mants to the dead
hand interests of the settlor, an outgrowth of the frequently paternalistic function of the donative trust.84
A. The Contractarian Nexus
The trust is more than a simple contract between private parties. It is
an organizational form with in rem as well as in personam dimensions. Thus,
like the corporation and other organizational forms, the trust blends an external
in rem asset partitioning dynamic with internal in personam contractarian
flexibility. The trust’s internal relationships are contractarian in that the law
supplies default terms around which the parties may contract; and they are contractarian in that the underlying governance problems posed by the asymmetric
information of the parties are amenable to principal-agent modeling.
True, there is tension between the contractarian metaphor and the position of the beneficiary. Beneficiaries are not normally thought to give ex ante
consent and they are typically in no position to bargain. Moreover, as discussed
in Part I, there remains much debate about whether the beneficiaries’ stake in
the trust is a species of obligation or property law. But even if the beneficiaries
do not literally contract with the other principal parties, and even if the beneficiaries’ stake is doctrinally more proprietary than contractarian, the problems of
governance relevant to the beneficiaries’ welfare are nonetheless illuminated by
contractarian principal-agent modeling. From an economic perspective, hidden
action (and possibly hidden information) abounds, so trust governance must confront both incentive and risk-sharing problems.85 Accordingly, greater insight
into the nature and function of trust law will come from a conception of the trust
as a de facto legal entity that serves as the organizing construct for an aggregation of contractarian relationships. This vision of the trust is analogous to the

The model of the corporation as a nexus of contracts, which has most notably been advanced by
Easterbook & Fischel, supra note __, is the clearest example.
82

See generally Sitkoff, supra note __. The trust has this in common with the close corporation. See
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs , 38 Stan. L. Rev. 271,
274-77 (1986).
83

See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, Spendthrift Trusts: Roots and Relevance for Twenty-First Century
Planning, 50 Rec. Assoc. Bar N.Y. 140 (1995).
84

85

See generally Eisenhardt, supra note __, at 58.
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Jensen and Meckling nexus of contracts model of the firm,86 and as was the case
for their analysis of the corporation, it implies the viability of agency costs
analysis for trust law.
Thus, to return to the exemplary trust described in the introduction,
which was settled by S for the benefit of B1 and B2 with T as trustee, the constituent relationships include those between S and T; T and the Bs; S and the
Bs; T and T’s creditors; the Bs and creditors of the Bs; S and S’s creditors; S and
a character known as the trust “protector” (who will be introduced later);87 the
Bs and the trust “protector”; T and the agents to whom T delegates authority;
and T’s delegates and the Bs.88 The dominant (and sometimes conflicting) relationships are between S and T and between the Bs and T.
Denaturing the trust into its constituent relationships brings into view
the applicability of hypothetical bargain analysis and the economics of the principal -agent problem. For if they are characterized by reference to their underlying economics, both the relationship between S and T and the relationship between the Bs and T might be modeled on the principal-agent scheme. The former is the temporal agency problem that helps distinguish the economic analysis of trust law from that of corporate law.89 The latter is the traditional agency
problem when risk-bearing is separated from management. This means that
there is the potential for considerable tension between T’s loyalty to S and T’s
loyalty to the Bs. As we shall see in the next Part, American trust law resolves
this tension by requiring T to maximize the welfare of the Bs within the ex ante

“It is important to recognize that most organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus
for a set of contracting relationships among individuals. . . . By ‘legal fiction’ we mean the artificial construct under the law which allows certain organizations to be treated as individuals. . . . The private
corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction that serves as a nexus for contracting relatio nships.” Jensen & Meckling, supra note __, at 56 & 367 n. 12. Cf. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note __, at
778; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note __, at 11-12.
86

87

See infra Part IV.B.4.

See, e.g., In re Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Co., 303 N.Y. 423 (1952); In re Kellogg, N.Y.L.J. 25 (Dec.
30, 1999). The importance of the relations that fall into these last two categories has increased with the
assimilation of portfolio theory into modern prudent investor standards. Current law now permits and
might even require amateur trustees to delegate investment authority to professionals—what Langbein
has called the “frac tionation of trusteeship.” John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and
the Future of Trust Investing, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 641, 665-66 (1996). See Uniform Prudent Investor Act §
9 (1994); Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 171 & cmt. f (1992); John H. Langbe in,
Reversing the Nondelegation Rule of Trust-Investment Law , 59 Mo. L. Rev. 105 (1994). See also Langbein, supra note __, at 72-73. Prudent investor rules in the U.K. are undergoing a similar shift. See,
e.g., Penelope Reed & Richard Wilson, The Trustee Act 2000: A Practical Guide (2001). These scenarios
might be amenable to modeling as a common agency. See B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston,
Common Agency, 54 Econometrica 923 (1986). See also Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask
Principal—Agency Analyses: Inventive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J. L. Econ. &
Org. 24 (1991); Hideshi Itoh, Incentive to Help in Multi-Agent Situations, 59 Econometrica 611 (1991);
Joel S. Demski, Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents, 33 J. Econ. Theory 152 (1984);
Bengt Holmstrom, Moral hazard in teams, 13 Bell J. Econ. 324 (1982).
88

And agency law too. Legal agency requires the ongoing existence of a principal under whose control
the agent acts. This enables the agent to seek clarification from the principal and the principal to maintain watch over the agent.
89
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constraints imposed by S. This is to say that under the American (but not ne cessarily the English) approach the donor’s intent controls.
B. The Office of the Trustee
The office of the trustee is in effect (though not formally) a separate entity from the trustee personally. This separate entity-like effect, which stems
from the trust’s partitioning of assets, implicates an in rem dynamic as it is effective against nonparties to the trust. The de facto office of trustee serves as
the organizing hub for the various relations that aggregate into the private
trust.90
With respect to creditors, turnover within the office of trustee and/or the
personal insolvency of a particular trustee does not affect the continuity of the
trust. Deals struck by a prior trustee as such bind successor trustees to the extent that they would have been enforceable against the prior trustee when in
office.91 The prior trustee, however, has no office-based liability to creditors of
the trust once out of office unless he or she personally guaranteed the obligation.
No trustee, whether in or out of office, has personal liability to outside creditors
of the trust unless he or she personally guaranteed the obligation.92 And the
personal creditors of an insolvent trustee—a rather rare phenomenon in donative trusts but an important consideration for commercial trusts—have no recourse against the assets of the trust.93
Moreover, the rules that govern the trustee’s liability towards creditors of
the trust property tend to be mandatory with respect to the settlor but default
with respect to the trustee and those with whom the trustee deals.94 They are
mandatory with respect to the settlor, because as to the settlor these rules have
an in rem quality—they touch on the rights of outsiders.95 And they are default
90

Cf. Hayton, supra note __, at 155.

See, e.g., Wood v. Potter, 289 N.W. 131, 133 (Mich. 1939); Schroeder v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 510
N.E.2d 1045, 1048-49 (Ill. App. 1987). The qualification addresses the possibi lity of self -dealing or other
grounds for voiding the transaction, and indeed the failure of a successor to pursue such remedies would
be an independent breach of trust. See infra note 97 and text accompanying.
91

See, e.g., UTC § 1010(a). The traditional rule of personal liability unless provided otherwise, see IIIA
Scott on Trusts § 261, p. 417; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 265 & cmt. a, can be un derstood as a
penalty default that forces trustees to disclose that they are operating in a representative rather than
individual capacity. See Hansman & Mattei, supra note __, at 459-61; Merrill & Smith, supra note __,
at 846-47.
92

See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __, a t 454 & n. 64 (collecting authority). See generally MacNair,
supra note __, at 224- 29.
93

See, e.g., UTC 1010(a); UTC § 105(b)(11) (“The terms of a trust prevail over [common and statu tory
law] except . . . the rights under Sections 1010 through 1013 of a person other than a trustee or beneficiary.”); UTC Art. 10 gen. cmt. (“The settlor may not limit the rights of pe rsons other than beneficiaries
as provided in Sections 1010 through 1013.”). See generally John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the
Law of Trusts (manuscript on file with author); Langbein, supra note __, at 76-79 (analyzing the UTC’s
mandatory features); English, supra note __, at 27. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 263; IIIA Scott
on Trusts § 263, pp. 423-32.
94

On similar reasoning agency law does not allow principals to opt out of liability to third parties on an
apparent authority theory. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 160-61.
95
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with respect to the trustee and outside creditors, because as to them these rules
concern only in personam matters. Parties may fix their rights with respect to
each other; but when outsiders are implicated, the law cabins the parties’ flexibility.
The rules of trustee liability towards beneficiaries are quite different, but
the distinctions follow naturally from the implication of the nexus of contracts
model of organizational forms that it is the trustee personally who agrees to
manage the assets held by the trustee as trustee. Thus, the beneficiaries may
seek to surcharge a trustee personally for breach of trust not only while in office
but also after the trustee has been sacked; removal does not extinguish the trustee’s personal liability for breaches committed while in office.96 The breaching
trustee’s successor, however, is not personally liable to the beneficiaries for the
prior trustee’s breach unless the successor unreasonably fails to discover and
rectify the prior breach. But liability in this scenario stems from the successor
trustee’s own breach.97
What is more, the rules of internal trust governance, which is to say the
in personam rights inter se of the beneficiaries, the settlor, and the trustee, are
for the most part default as to the settlor.98 That not all of these rules are default, however, suggests that there is an irreducible foundation of trust governance law that is mandatory. Indeed, as Langbein explains in a contemporaneous
article on trust law’s mandatory rules, even though a settlor may opt out of ind ividual fiduciary duties, he cannot authorize a “bad faith” trusteeship or oust fiduciary law in its entirety. 99
Part of the explanation for these limits are the obvious agency costs consequences of giving the trustee unfettered discretion. As the Delaware Supreme
Court put it in a recent opinion, “A trust in which there is no legally binding o bligation on a trustee is a trust in name only.”100 But there is more. Further explanation lies in the necessity of keeping clear for third-parties who would deal
with the trustee the distinction between property transferred to the trustee in
trust versus outright gifts or other forms of limited transfer such as equitable
charges.101 So there is a mandatory irreducible minimum of trust go vernance,
As a practical matter this liability will almost always be fixed in an accounting proceeding made inc ident to the removal action.
96

See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 223; III Scott on Trusts § 223, pp. 395-96. This explains why
many professionally-drafted trustee succession provisions absolve the successor from this audit respo nsibility. Without that absolution, many potential successors would decline to serve. For further discussion and references, see Vollmar, Hess, & Whitman, supra note __, at 1072-73.
97

98

See, e.g., UTC § 105; Langbein, supra note __.

See Langbein, manuscript supra note __. The motivation for doing so is often to deny entitlement to
beneficiaries who the settlor wants to benefit, but not too much—not any further than the settlor’s delegate, the trustee, would otherwise allow.
99

100

McNeil v. McNeil, 798 A.2d 503, 509 (Del. 2002).

Cf. Merrill & Smith, supra note __. An equitable charge is created when one party transfers property
to another, not subject to a fiduciary obligation (indeed the transferee is permitted to benefit personally
from the transferred property), but nevertheless subject to the right of a third party to receive a pay101
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not only to serve a protective and cautionary function for the settlor who would
otherwise swamp his or her beneficiary in an agency costs morass (a goal that
might have been achieved with a penalty default102), but also because on this
issue the in personam (i.e., internal governance) converges with the in rem (i.e.,
external relations authority).103
C. The Relative Position of the Settlor
The settlor’s intent to create a trust is a prerequisite to trust formation.104 This means that Langbein’s third-party beneficiary contract between
the settlor and the trustee is the trigger, as it were, for the set of individual relationships that compose the trust. The settlor-trustee relationship is indeed
contractual, as settlors and trustees are free to dicker over the terms of the trust
such as compensation (even if in fact they do not).105 This leads to three points.
First, as Langbein has shown, when interpreting the trustee’s obligations
under the trust instrument, an intention-seeking standard is normatively desirable.106 This prescription follows from the insight that in the case of a voluntary
transaction between adults, the joint intent of the parties carries a presumption
of pareto optimality.107 Not surprisingly, the new Restatement of Property for
donative transfers points in this direction,108 a positive trend that is also consistent with the idea of the settlor as the dominant principal. Moreover, for the
usual transaction-costs-savings reasons, the underlying law of trust governance
should supply those terms for which the majority of settlors and trustees would
have dickered with full information and low negotiation costs.109 “The proper
ment from the transferee. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 5(h) & cmt. h; I Scott on Trusts §§
10, 10.3, 10.4; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 10 & cmts. a-b; Ogle v. Durley, 77 So.2d 688, 691-92
(Miss. 1955).
102

See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note __.

103

For further discussion, see Langbein, manuscript supra note __; infra Part IV.C.

104

See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 13; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 23; UTC § 402(a)(2).

See, e.g., Langbein, supra note __, at 639, 651. See also Getzler, supra note __, at 4. Whether or not
there is much dickering in practice doesn’t alter the contractual nature of the unde rlying relationship.
All that a lack of actual bargaining suggests is that either (i) the default rules (or, more clearly, the
standardized forms and fee schedules typically used by corporate fiduciaries) closely approximate median preferences, or (ii) amateurs such as family members who are dragged into the role are motivated
by altruism rather than fees, and indeed such amateurs often receive no fees at all. See also Langbein,
supra note __, at 639 & n. 66 (comparing the marketing of trust services with the sales of vacuum cleaners).
105

Langbein, supra note __, at 663-64. See also Halbach, supra note __ at 1881; Parkinson, supra note
__, at 676- 79; Cf. Hayton, supra note __, at 96.
106

See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World 80-82 (1995); Easte rbrook & Fischel,
supra note __, at 22-25.
107

“The controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a donative document is the donor’s
intention. The donor’s intent is given effect to the maximum extent allowed by law.” Restatement
(Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 10.1 (2003).
108

See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 15.6, p. 454 (6th ed. 2003); Ayres & Gertner,
supra note __, at 89-91 (collecting scholarly statements); Wal- Mart Stores, Inc. Associates’ Health and
Welfare Plan v. Wells, 213 F.3d 398, 402 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, C.J.) (ERISA). See also Posner, at §
109
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question becomes: What was the intention of the parties to the trust deal respecting this point, and if they did not articulate their intention on this matter,
which default rule captures the likely bargain they would have struck had they
thought about it.”110
Second, in view of the potential ex ante informational asymmetries between repeat-player trust lawyers and institutional fiduciaries on the one hand,
and settlors on the other, there is room in the law of trusts as a normative matter for the occasional welfare-enhancing, information-forcing penalty default
rule.111 And indeed as a positive matter such penalty defaults do exist. Perhaps
the most salient example concerns clauses that exculpate the trustee from liability to the beneficiaries for breach of trust. Before enforcing these exoneration
clauses, courts often require a showing that the settlor had affirmative knowledge of the clause and its meaning.112 By forcing this term to be transparent,
the rule helps to ensure that the exculpation clause was not mere boilerplate
unwittingly embraced by the settlor.
Third, in contrast to the founder of a corporation or a commercial trust,113
the settlor of a donative private trust receives no direct price signal about the
quality of the governance arrangement to which he or she agrees with the trustee.114 There is no public offering for beneficial interests in a donative private
trust, and potential beneficiaries don’t purchase their rights from the settlor. So
the only price signal in donative trusts about potential governance structures is
both weak and ambiguous—the level of commissions, if any, demanded by the
trustee.115 In conjunction with the potential for informational asymmetries
noted just above, this bolsters the case for the occasional information-forcing de-

4.1, p. 96, § 14.3, p. 413, § 14.7, pp. 427-28. This is an implication of R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
110

Langbein, supra note __, at 664.

See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note __. The informational asymmetry between trust lawyers and
settlor/clients is a source of agency costs in the legal market.
111

See III Scott on Trusts § 222.4, pp. 393-95; UTC § 1008(b) & cmt (“Subsection (b) responds to the
danger that the insertion of such a clause by the fiduciary or its agent may have been undi sclosed or
inadequately understood by the settlor.”); Restatement (Second) § 222(3) & cmt d. See also Langbein,
manuscript supra note __, at 33-34; Report on Exculpation Clauses in Trust Instruments: Committee
on the Modernization of the Trustee Act, 22 Est. Tr. Pen. J. 55 (2003) (Canadian law); David Hayton,
English Fiduciary Standards and Trust Law , 32 Vand. J. Trans. L. 555, 580 (1999) (English law); Langbein, supra note __, at 74-75 (discussing the UTC).
112

113

See Schwarcz, supra note __, at 562.

114

Cf. Jensen & Meckling, supra note __, at 58:
[T]he owner will bear the entire wealth effects of these expected costs so long as the
equity market anticipates these effects. Prospective minority shareholders will realize that the owner-manager’s interests will diverge somewhat from theirs; hence the
price which they will pay for shares will reflect the monitoring costs and the effect of
the divergence between the manger’s inte rest and theirs.

The signal is weak in both directions. Professionals often have company-wide fee schedules, and
amateurs such as family members often serve without commission. See supra note 105.
115
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fault rule and/or in some cases possibly even disregarding the intent of the
settlor.116
None of this is to suggest that settlors are disinterested in the quality of
the trust’s governance regime. To the contrary, a common purpose in settling a
trust in the first place, tax exigencies and controlling personal ities to one side,117
is to maximize the welfare of the beneficiaries. The point of the prior par agraph
is that settlors do not receive the sort of price signals that would force them accurately to internalize the costs and benefits of the governance arrangement to
which they agree with the trustee. Hence, to paraphrase the condition posited
by Easterbrook and Fischel as necessary for skepticism about a term in the cognate context of the corporate contract, the consequences for beneficiary welfare
of the terms of the trust might “not have been appreciated by” the settlor.118
D. Beneficiaries as Residual Claimants
The trustee, individuals hired by the trustee to assist in the trust’s management, and those who do business with the trustee as trustee all have fixed
claims on the trust corpus that generally have priority over the claims of the
beneficiaries. Trustees are free to negotiate for their own fee schedules or other
terms designed to protect their interests,119 and those who do business with the
trustee over trust assets can likewise protect themselves by contract. Beneficiaries of donative trusts, however, are limited to taking so much as the trust instrument allows out of whatever is left of the trust’s assets when everyone else
is done.120 “The residual risk—the risk of the difference between stochastic [i.e.,
variable] inflows of resources and promised payments to agents—is borne by
those who contract for the rights to net cash flows. We call these agents the residual claimants or residual risk bearers.”121
To say that the be neficiaries are the residual claimants is to say that
managerial decisions are infra-marginal for all the relevant players except for
the beneficiaries. This may provide an agency costs explanation for why the default rule for irrevocable trusts is that only the beneficiaries may sue the trustee

116

For further discussion and references, see Langbein, manuscript supra note __.

Anecdotes from practitioners suggest that some settlors are so control-oriented that their chief motivation is to maintain dominance over their family after death, seeking not just to minimize taxes but
sometimes even sacrificing that goal in order to maintain control over the beneficiaries’ behavior. See
also infra note 196. For discussion of strategic intergenerational transfers, see B. Do uglas Bernheim,
Andrei Shleifer, & Lawrence H. Summers, The Strategic Bequest Motive, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 1045 (1985).
117

Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note __, at 17, 23-25, 31. Cf. Langbein, manuscript su pra note __, at
Part II.
118

119

See supra note __ and text accompanying.

The limitation to donative trusts is necessary because in the commercial context the settlor is often
the residual claimant. In these cases the beneficiaries are typically investors in trust certif icates that,
like debt, only entitle the investors to a return of their investment plus interest. Thereafter any surplus
value goes back to the settlor. See Schwarcz, supra note __, at 562-53.
120

121

Fama & Jensen, supra note __, at 328. Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note __, at 67-70.
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for a breach of trust.122 And on the same reasoning the default fiduciary obligations of the trustee are designed to create incentives for the trustee to manage
the trust from the beneficiaries’ (and hence the marginal) perspective. The
trend towards the managerial trust, moreover, increases the significance of the
beneficiaries’ residual position. Now that the trust is used for more than intergenerational conveyances and the preservation of ancestral land, status as a
trust beneficiary brings both greater potential risk and greater potential reward.123
Against the foregoing it might be argued that because private trust beneficiaries are nothing more than passive recipients of a donative transfer, the
analogy to Jensen and Meckling’s nexus of contracts metaphor does not hold.
Indeed, even though acceptance (which can be implied) is a required element of
every gift,124 trust beneficiaries do not give consent to their status as such in the
same way that parties give consent to a literal contractual relationship. But the
nexus of contracts model is just that, a model; and the economics of agency does
provide a helpful framework for understanding the law’s default solutions to
problems of governance.
Hence, an important further benefit of the agency costs approach to trust
law is that it invites comparison of the trust to other organizational forms. This
expands the potential for drawing on empirical insights, albeit if only by analogy. Thus far, the typical trust law empirical project has been comparative. Although the common law trust is uniquely Anglo-American,125 there is nontrivial
variation within the common law countries;126 and naturally there is also utility
to studying how the non common law countries have adapted to their nominal
lack of an explicit law of trusts.127 But this comparative approach tends to be
qualitative rather than quantitative, no doubt because of the difficulty in obtaining good data on trusts in practice.128 In contrast, thick capital markets provide
ample data for quantitative analysis of theoretical predictions about the impact

See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 200; III Scott on Trusts §§ 200, 200.1. But see infra Parts
IV.B.3. and IV.B.4.
122

123

See Langbein, supra note __, at 642.

124

See Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 6.1 & cmt i.

In fairness, however, it must be noted that many of the civil law countries have long had trust-like
devices. See Richard Helmholz & Reinhard Zimmermann, View of Trust and Treuhand: An Introdu ction 27-31, in Helmholz & Zimmermann, supra note __. See also Maurizio Lupo i, The Civil Law Trust,
32 Vand. J. Trans. L. 967 (1999); Adair Dyer, International Recognition and Adaption of Trusts: The
Influence of the Hague Convention, 32 Vand. J. Trans. L. 989 (1999); Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, The Hague
Convention on Trusts: Much Ado About Very Little , 3 J. Int. Tr. Corp. Plan. 5 (1994).
125

126

Several examples are discussed in infra Part IV.

See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __, at 435-36; Donovan Waters, Private Foundations (Civil Law)
versus Trusts (Common Law), 21 Ests., Tr. & Pens. J. 281 (2002); Helmholz & Zimmermann, supra note
__. See also Langbein, su pra note __, at 669- 71.
127

128

See Sitkoff, supra note __, at __; Langbein, supra note __, at 178.
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of corporate law on shareholder welfare.129 So analogical comparisons to the
empirical literature on whether specific corporate governance mechanisms improve investor welfar e might help inform the analysis of whether specific trust
governance mechanisms improve beneficiary welfare.
IV.

APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL

By reference to illustrative applications, this Part demonstrates the positive and normative power of the agency costs approach. The normative claim is
that the law of private trusts should minimize the agency costs inherent to locating managerial authority with the trustee and the residual claim with the
beneficiaries, but only to the extent that doing so is consistent with the ex ante
instructions of the settlor. The qualification gives priority to the settlor over the
beneficiaries as the trustee’s primary principal. Hence, to return once again to
our exemplary trust settled by S for the benefit of B1 and B2 with T as trustee,
this means that T should maximize the welfare of B1 and B2 subject to the ex
ante limits imposed by S. Consequently, the optimal solution to the Bs/T principal-agent problem, which is for the Bs to sell the residual claim to T (doing so
would solve both the incentive and risk-sharing problems),130 is foreclosed by the
settlor’s choice of the trust over an outright transfer. So in view of the exigency
of honoring the paternalistic motives of the donative settlor, the best that the
law of trust governance can hope for is a second -best solution to the Bs/T agency
problem.
The positive claim is that, at least with respect to traditional doctrines,
the law of trusts conforms to the suggested normative approach. Indeed, as
Edward Halbach, the Reporter for the new Third Restatement of Trusts recently
observed, a “theme” in modern trust law “is flexibility and efficiency in the pursuit of the best interests of the beneficiaries within the settlor’s legally permissible objectives.”131
A. Donative Beneficiaries as Residual Claimants
As we have seen, agency costs analysis would have us classify the beneficiaries of donative trusts as “residual claimants.” Claims on the assets of the
trust by all the other relevant parties—most notably the trustee and those with
whom the trustee transacts as trustee—are usually set by express contract and
have a higher priority than the beneficiaries’ claim. Thus, like the residual
claimants in any other organizational form, donative trust beneficiaries bear the
residual risk of good or bad performance. Put more formally, managerial decisions regarding the trust’s assets are usually infra-marginal to all but the beneSee, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part I: Techn ique and Corproate Litigation, 4 Amer. L. & Econ. Rev. 141 (2002); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies
and the Law: Part II – Empirical Studies of Corporate Law , 4 Amer. L. & Econ. Rev. 380 (2002).
129

See Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, supra note __, at 482-83. This assumes that T is either risk neutral or at least less risk-averse than the Bs. See infra Part IV.A.3.
130

131

Halbach, supra note 21, at 1881. See also Ogus, supra note __, at 205.
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ficiaries. The emergence of the managerial trust, moreover, has enlarged the
range of the beneficiaries’ potential risk and reward.132 In this respect modern
trust beneficiaries are beginning more closely to resemble the residual claimants
of other organizational forms than the trust beneficiaries of yore.
Yet today’s typical donative trust beneficiaries have some interesting
characteristics, relevant to reckoning the probable intent of the settlor, that distinguish them from the residual claimants of other organizational forms. In
view of these characteristics and the relevant agency costs analysis, this section
explains the operation of three rules of private trust governance as consistent
with the likely preferences of the parties. In other words, these distinguishing
characteristics reflect important empirical assumptions that underpin the hypothetical bargain that is encoded in traditional trust doctrine.133 When choosing
an organizational form, one looks for the form in which the default empirical assumptions about risk-preferences, the number of residual claimants, the thickness of the relevant markets, and so on most closely resemble one’s own situation. Doing so minimizes the transaction costs of customizing the form to fit
one’s particular needs.134
1. The duty of impartiality. The law of trusts nicely facilitates the creation of residual claimants with interests adverse to each other. The still classic
example, here described with reference to our exemplary private trust, is a trust
for the lifetime income benefit of one party (say, B1) with the remainder principal benefit to another (say, B2). As residual c laimants B1 and B2’s overall interests are grossly aligned on matters such as self-dealing or embezzlement by T.
But often their specific interests in the day-to-day management of the trust will
not be congruent. The most obvious example is that B1 should prefer incomeproducing investments while B2 should prefer capital appreciation.135 This creates “conflicts among the claim holders of different states because alternative
decisions shift payoffs across states and benefit some claim holders at the expense of others.”136
Trust law’s amenability to having residual claimants with adverse interests thus poses a challenge for crafting an effective governance regime, because
the preference set of the residual claimants, in whose interests the trust should
be managed, may not be coherent. In corporate law, by comparison, the basic
aim of profit-maximization is assumed to be shared by all shareholders (their

132

See Langbein, supra note __, at 637-43.

Cf. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of Corporations, 27
Del. J. Corp. L. 499 (2002).
133

134

See, e.g., Ogus, supra note __, at 187.

See, e.g., Dennis v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 744 F.2d 893 (1st Cir. 1984); Dobris, supra note
__, at 569- 71. See also Joel C. Dobris, Why Trustee Investors Often Prefer Div idends to Capital Gain
and Debt Investments to Equity—A Daunting Principal and Income Problem, 32 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr.
J. 255 (1997).
135

136

Fama & Jensen, supra note __, at 329.
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preferences are said to be “single-peaked”), which helps corporate governance
avoid the well-known pathologies of agenda manipulation and c ycling.137
Trust law’s evolutionary response for aggregating the otherwise conflicting interests of different classes of beneficiaries is the fiduciary duty of impartiality.138 The duty of impartiality requires the trustee to “act impartially in investing, managing, and distributing the trust property, giving due regard to the
beneficiaries’ respective interests.”139 Thus, under the default trust governance
arrangement, T cannot justify an action as benefiting B1 over B2. Instead, T
must justify his or her actions in relation to the aggregate welfare of B1 and
B2—i.e., of all the residual claimants—as a class. In effect, the trust’s residual
claimants’ interests are made coherent by directing the trustee to act in view of
their needs rather than their individual wants. The overarching directive of the
duty of impartiality is that of balance.140
This seems consistent with the settlor’s probable intent. True, in the
foregoing example one might argue that because S intended B1 to receive an
immediate benefit and intended B2 to receive only the residue on the death of
B1, S rated B1’s position as superior to B2’s. But that seems a thin basis for
concluding that S wanted T to prefer the interests of B1 over B2. If S had such
a preference, it would have been simple enough to put something to that effect
in the trust instrument; and in the absence of such language, given the gratuitous basis of the traditional private trust, we assume that S wanted T to exe rcise discretion in balancing the interests of the named beneficiaries over time in
view of the specific context.141 This stands in contrast to the law of corporations,
which requires managers to favor the most residual of the residual claimants in
the case of conflict between them,142 though of course within the same class of

See Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1103, 1110 n. 28 (2002); Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1599, 1611–12 (1989); Frank
H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law , 26 J. L. & Econ. 395, 405–06 (1983).
137

“Unfortunately, over the years, the true nature and implications of the duty of impartia lity have
been little explained, and vaguely defined at best, in the cases and literature.” Halbach, su pra note __,
at 1912.
138

139

UTC § 803. See also Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 183, 232.

See Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227 cmts. c & i; Halbach, supra note __,
at 549; Halbach, supra note __, at 1913; Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third
Restatement, 27 Real Prop., Prob, & Tr. J. 407, 441-45 (1992).
140

Thus, the trustee “has considerable discretion in preserving the balance between the beneficiar ies.”
Scott on Trusts § 232, p. 232. This means that “balance” is not synonymous with equal treatment.
Thus if B1 was S’s widow and B2 was a distant cousin, then T could lawfully tip the balance in favor of
B1. “There is . . . no absolute rule on this matter and under some circumstances [favoring the life or
remainder beneficiaries] might be justified.” Id.
141

See Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947); Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law § 14.5,
p. 636 (1986); Bainbridge, supra note __, at § 7.4, p. 342.
142
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stock all shareholders must be treated equally. 143 Trust law’s duty of impartiality applies both within and across beneficiary classes.
From this perspective the duty of impartiality is both a critical feature of
trust governance and a salient distinguishing default characteristic of trust law
as organizational law. It is a critical feature of private trust governance, because without it often there would be no coherent set of residual claimants in
whose interests the trust’s managers should operate. And it is a salient distinguishing default characteristic of the law of private trusts, relevant to choice of
form for commercial transactions,144 because the duty is not an explicit part of
the default fiduciary obligation of the managers of most other organizational
forms.
Thus the law of trusts has considerable experience with the problem of
balancing the interests of claim holders of different states, and this might be a
reason to choose the deal reflected within trust law’s default governance regime
over the deal reflected by the default governance arrangements of other organizations.145 As Steven Schwarcz has explained, one “should consider using the
trust form of business organization where residual claimants do no t expect
management to favor their class of claims over senior claimants.”146
2. Total return investing. Complementing the duty of impartiality is the
modern trend towards total return investing.147 Motivated by the teachings of
modern portfolio theory, 148 total return investing has been codified in the recent
revisions to the prudent investor standards that underpin trust law’s fiduc iary
duty of care.149 The basic idea is that trustees are to craft a diversified portfolio
in view of its balance of overall rather than investment-specific risk and potential return.150 A contemporaneous reform revised the definitions of “princ ipal”
The clearest application of this principle is the rule against non-pro-rata distributions, which
prevents controlling shareholders from favoring themselves. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280
A.2d 717 (Del. 1971); Bainbridge, supra note __, at § 7.4, pp. 338-40.
143

144

See Schwarcz, supra note __, at 575-80.

Reasoning along similar lines, Daniel Fischel and John Langbein have suggested “that the duty of
impartiality should be imported into pension law” as a response to the frequency of adverse interests
among pension fund beneficiaries. Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental
Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule , 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1105, 1119-21, 1159-60 (1988). And
indeed courts have done just that. For discussion and references, see John H. Langbein & Bruce A.
Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law 680, 848 (3d ed. 2000).
145

146

Schwarcz, supra note __, at 579.

147

See, e.g., Lyman W. Welch, Brave New World of Total Return Laws, Tr. & Est. 24 (June 2002).

See, e.g., Macey, An Introduction to Modern Financial Theory (2d ed. 1998). Influential early applications to trust-investment law include John H. Langbein & Richard A. Po sner, Market Fu nds and
Trust- Investment Law, 1976 Am. B. F. Res. J. 1; John H. Langbein & Ric hard A. Posner, Market Funds
and Trust- Investment Law: II, 1977 Am. B. F. Res. J. 1; Bevis Longstreth, Modern Investment Management and the Prudent Man Rule (1986). See also Harvey E. Bines, Modern Portfolio Theory and
Investment Management Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 721 (1976).
148

149

See generally Halbach, supra note __; Langbein, supra note 88.

See Uniform Prudent Investor Act §§ 2-3; Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule §
227(a). See also John H. Langbein, The New American trust-investment Act , 8 Tr. L. Int’l 123, 123-24
150
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and “income,” making porous the boundary between the two.151 Together, total
return investing and more flexible definitions of principal and income have the
potential to ease the tension between lifetime and remainder beneficiaries by
refocusing the trustee’s balancing of their interests on a more transparent margin—namely, the ex post allocation to one or the other of the trust’s total return
receipts.152
Specifically, the 1997 Uniform Principal and Income Act refocuses the
tension between capital appreciation and present income production on the trustee’s ex post power “equitably” to “adjust” the classification of specific
investment returns within the total return portfolio as “income” or “principal.”153
The so-called unitrust,154 which is an alternative to equitable adjustment that
provides a fixed percentage of the trust corpus each year to the “income”
beneficiaries with the remainder left for the “principal” beneficiaries,155 likewise
eases the tension.
With equitable adjustment or a unitrust, the higher the total return, the
better all the beneficiaries do.156 The latter does so with less discretion and so
fewer agency costs. But it less perfectly aligns the interests of the income and
principal beneficiaries, because much of the potential upside from higher risk
investments will accrue to the principal beneficiaries. The former somewhat
better aligns the beneficiaries’ interests, but it does so with higher agency costs
because it gives the trustee additional discretion. Still, the exercise of this discretion is more transparent than the former approach of hiding the problem behind the portfolio’s initial allocation between income -producing and capitalappreciating investments.
Thus the trend towards total return investing, like the duty of impartiality, can be understood as the sort of agency-costs-minimizing rules to which the
parties probably would have agreed had dickering been feasible. Indeed, in larger trusts that were to be managed by professional trustees, opting out of the
(1994). Damages in surcharge actions for imprudence should likewise reflect the total return imperative. See Sitkoff, supra note __, at __.
151

Uniform Principal and Income Act (1997).

See Halbach, supra note __, at 1913-14. See also Langbein, supra note 88, at 666-69. For a further,
economically- informed discussion of principal and income, see Gordon, supra note __, at 99-112.
152

Uniform Principal and Income Act §§ 103-04. See generally Joel C. Dobris, New Forms of Private
Trusts for the Twenty-First Century—Principal and Income, 31 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 1 (1996); Joel
C. Dobris, The Probate World at the End of the New Century: Is a New Principal and Income Act in
Your Future?, 28 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 393 (1993).
153

154

See, e.g., 12 Del. C. § 3527; N.Y. Est. Powers & Trus ts Law § 11- 2.4; IL P.A. 92- 0838.

See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 88, at 669; Jerold I. Horn, Prudent Investor Rule, Modern Portfolio
Theory, and Private Trusts: Drafting and Administration Including the “Giv e- Me-Five” Un itrust, 33
Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 1 (1998); Robert B. Wolf, Total Return Trusts —Can Your Clients Afford Anything Less?, 33 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 131 (1998). Cf. Joel C. Dobris, Real Return, Modern Portfolio
Theory, and College Universi ty, and Foundation Decisions on Annual spending from Endowments: A
Visit to the World of Spending Rules, 28 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 49 (1993).
155

156

See generally Macey, supra note __, at 77-80.
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recently discarded prior prudent investor standards was not uncommon.157 And
many professionally-drafted trust instruments authorized the trustee to invade
princ ipal for the benefit of the income beneficiaries.
3. Risk tolerance and the duty of care. In the paradigmatic donative
trust, the residual claimants are risk-averse (think widows and orphans) but the
trend is towards trustees who are risk-neutral (this is the usual economic assumption for business organizations) or at least less risk-averse than the beneficiaries.158 That is, owing to the trend towards professional trustees, the typical
modern trustee—whether a sophisticated individual such as a trust lawyer or
an institution such as a bank—is likely to be less risk-averse than the typical
beneficiary. There is, after all, no well-developed market for beneficial interests
in American trusts.159 Hence the beneficiaries can’t easily diversify, and when
one can’t diversify the standard economic assumption is that of riskaverseness.160 Corporate trustees, by contrast, are by definition risk-neutral (to
repeat, this is the textbook assumption for business organizations), and individual trustees can diversify and in some cases can even insure against loss.161
This is not to suggest that trustees are indifferent to risk or that beneficiaries will never prefer aggressive portfolios of high-risk investments. Rather
the point concerns the relative discounts, if any, that the parties assign to expected values in the face of uncertainty. 162 The basic intuition is that the und iversified have a distaste for volatility, preferring instead lower expected returns
with less risk of a substantial loss—and this even if the probability that the substantial loss will materialize is relatively small. Thus the more risk-averse one
is, the more likely one is to prefer a smaller but certain sum (say, $100) over a
chance of a larger sum (say, $200) even if the larger sum ($200), when discounted by its probability (say, 60%), is still larger than the smaller but certain
sum (here $120 versus $100).
The disparity in the trustees’ and the beneficiaries’ attitudes towards
risk that stems from this institutional design poses a challenge for trust govern-

See Getzler, supra note __, at 3-4; Gordon, supra note __, at 75-76 & n. 99; Posner, supra note __, at §
15.6, p. 455.
157

The human agents of an institutional fiduciary who are assigned to manage a particular trust, however, are likely to be risk -averse. But this is an agency problem within the institution’s organizational
structure, and analysis of that problem is beyond the scope of this p aper.
158

See Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note __, at 641 (noting an English auction in reversions and remainders and remarking that no “such organized market exists in this country.”). See also infra note
259 and text accompanying.
159

See Eisenhardt, supra note __, at 60-61; Varian, supra note § 12.6, p. 228. Behavioral studies, however, are critical of this assumption. See, e.g., Nicholas Barberis & Ming Huang, Mental Accounting,
Loss Aversion, and Individual Stock Returns, 56 J. Fin. 1247, 1254 (2001).
160

Legal malpractice insurance, for example, often includes some coverage for liability in fiduciary administration.
161

Clear introductory explanations can be found in Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics
50-53 (4th ed. 2003), and Varian, supra note __, at §§ 12.5-12.7, pp. 224- 229.
162
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ance.163 In the absence of the fiduciary obligation or other corrective mechanisms trustees would often be less averse to volatility than the beneficiaries.164
Trust law’s particular flavor of the fiduciary duty of care can be understood as
an answer to this challenge.165 Care in trust law is the functional equivalent of
the objective reasonable person standard in tort law.166 The trustee must “exe rcise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing
with his own property.”167 This duty counsels caution, and that is what undive rsified, risk-averse beneficiaries would prefer. Accordingly, the commonplace that
portfolio management by trustees in practice is overly cautious likely reflects
some combination of too much deterrence from the duty of care and a selection
effect in the initial choice of cautious trustees by the settlor.168
The contrast between the duty of care in trust law and corporate law is
instructive.169 In corporate law the business judgment rule requires deference
to the ordinary business decisions of management unless they’re tainted by a
conflict of interest or are so unreasonable as to amount to gross negligence.170
This is a rather looser constraint,171 but the business judgment rule is justifiable
Agency relationships, in other words, present both incentive and risk-sharing problems. See, e.g.,
Eisenhardt, supra note __, at 58.
164 Commissions are often set as a percentage of the trust corpus. See, e.g., SCPA § 2309; Langbein,
supra note __, at 639, 651. There is, however, an emerging trend, supported by acade m ics, towards a
“reasonableness” standard. See Cal. Prob. Code § 15681; Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 38; UTC §
708; Halbach supra note __, at 1909. See generally Vollmar, Hess & Whitman, supra note __, at 1059;
Gordon, supra note __, at 82-83.
163

An idea adverted to in Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note __, at 437.
See Uniform Prudent Investor Act § 1 cmt.; Langbein, supra note __ at 656. See generally Cooter &
Freedman, supra note __, at 1057-59.
165
166

Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 174. See also Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Pru dent Investor Rule
§ 227 cmt. d. See generally Joshua Getzler, Duty of Care, in Peter Birks & Arianna Pretto, eds., Breach
of Trust 41-74 (2002).
167

Conservatism might also stem from the rule of unanimity in trustee decisionmaking. See Ogus, supra note __, at 209-10. This lends support to the rejection of the unanimity requirement by UTC § 703
and Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 39, as does the observation that many drafters in practice lik ewise
reject the unanimity requirement. Indeed, there has been considerable statutory activity on this issue
as well. See Reporter’s Notes to cmt. a of Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 39. This is related to Steven
Schwarcz’s suggestion that the “essential distinction between [commercial trusts and corporations]
turns on the degree to which assets need to be placed at risk in order to satisfy the expectations of
residual claimants.” Schwarcz, supra note __, at 561.
168

169

See Gordon, supra note __, at 94-96.

See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1971); Bain bridge, supra note __, at § 6.4. The
UK has in practice, though admittedly not in name, something of a business judgment rule too. See
Brian Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure, and Operation 313 (1997); Devlin v. Slough Estates
Ltd. ([1983] Butterworth’s Company Law Cases 497, 504); Company Law Review Steering Group, Developing the Framework (2000), ¶¶ 3.69-3.70, available online at http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/
claw_2_3.pdf (visited May 11, 2003).
170

Of course, one must be careful about accepting doctrinal labels as conclusive as to whether prudence
in trust law and business judgment in corporate law beget different outcomes. Indeed, there is ample
authority for deferential review of trustee decis ionmaking, see, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Trusts §
187, and the business judgment rule is not an abdication of the judicial function by the courts. Cf.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, available online at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=429260. But the different emphases in the canonical statements is telling, and
although in numerous cases courts have found a breach of the duty of care by a trustee, see, e.g., Scott
171
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from an agency costs perspective in view of the different context in which it operates. Corporate law draws from portfolio theory a paradigmatic shareholder
who is diversified.172 And diversified shareholders like the business judgment
rule, because insulating managers from liability in the absence of egregious
conduct, it helps offset the managers’ incentives—including their large investment of human capital and pe rsonal wealth in the firm—towards avoiding
risk.173
Trust law, in contrast, assumes that the beneficiaries are not dive rsified,
so the trustee’s default duty of care is set at the more restrictive reasonableperson threshold. On this view the different manifestations of the duty of care
in corporate and trust law reflect different expectations regarding internal and
external diversification.174 In donative trusts diversification for the residual
claimants is usually obtained internally.
Of course, given their other holdings some beneficiaries might well be diversified. For this possibility modern prudent investor standards require the
trustee to consider the “risk tolerance” of the trust’s particular beneficiaries in
crafting the trust portfolio.175 Trust investment strategies, in other words,
should be a function of the beneficiaries’ attitudes towards risk. Young scions of
great wealth can better absorb higher volatility than elderly widows of modest
means. So a “trust whose main purpose is to support an elderly widow of mo dest means will have a lower risk tolerance than a trust to accumulate for a
young scion of great wealth.”176 When the trust’s beneficiaries are better dive rsified, in other words, the trustees can (and indeed should) design a more aggressive portfolio.

on Trusts § 174, cases holding that a manager of a publicly traded corporation breached the duty of care
are almost nonexistent. See Bainbridge, supra note __, at §§ 6.2, 6.4; Allen & Kraakman, supra note __,
at § 8.4.2, p. 254, § 13.4, pp. 518-19.
See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Corporate Finance 120 (5th ed. 2003).
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note __, at 93-102; Peter V. Letsou, Implications of Shareholder
Diversification on Corporate Law and Organization: The Case of the Business Judgment Rule , 77 Chi.Kent L. Rev. 179 (2001); Joy v. North , 692 F.2d 880, 885-86 & n. 6 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J.); Bainbridge, supra note __, at § 6.3, pp. 259-63.
172
173

For a complementary analysis, see Rock & Wachter, supra note __, at 652-68. Note also that managerial decisions regarding a portfolio of liquid assets is easier to monitor than decisions regarding net
present value of a corporation’s operating assets. See Macey, supra note __, at 317-19. Exogenous factors impact the results of the latter whereas the former can be compared to the performance of a hypothetical prudent portfolio, thereby netting out secular market trends. For further discussion and references, see Sitkoff, supra note __, at __.
174

See Uniform Prudent Investor Act § 2; Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 227 cmt. e; Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement, 27 Real Prop., Prob, & Tr. J. 407, 436-37,
444-45 (1992).
175

See Uniform Prudent Investor Act § 2(b) & cmt. See also Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor
Rule § 227(a). See generally Ogus, supra note __, at 196.
176
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B. The Settlor/Beneficiary Tension
In light of the agency costs considerations on both sides, this section explores four examples of how the law of private trusts balances the ex post preferences of the beneficiaries with the ex ante wishes of the settlor. To return once
again to our exemplary trust, settled by S for the benefit of B1 and B2 (collectively the “Bs”) with T as the trustee, the nub of the problem is that the Bs bear
the marginal costs and benefits of T’s managerial decisions, but the ex ante
preferences of S trump the later wishes of the Bs in guiding T’s management.177
A variant of the well-known dead hand problem (which is perhaps a pejorative
aphorism for the idea that the settlor’s intent controls),178 this tension has been
exacerbated by the modern trend towards the use of the trust as a vehicle for
asset management by professionals. The modern managerial trust vests greater
discretion in the hands of the trustee, and increased discretion broadens the
range of the trustee’s hidden action. Moreover, the ongoing erosion of the rule
against perpetuities is expanding the temporal scope of the trustee’s discretionary authority and hence the likelihood of later circumstances unanticipated by
the settlor.179
1. Modification and termination. A nice example of the potential for divergent interests between the settlor and the beneficiaries concerns the possibility of the beneficiaries’ seeking the premature termination of the trust. This
problem includes the issue of whether the beneficiaries can seek modification of
the trust’s terms, as the power to modify is generally held to be subsumed
within the power to terminate.180 The American rule, which originated with
Claflin v. Claflin,181 may be summed up as unfriendly. Under the Claflin doctrine , a trust may be terminated prematurely with the settlor’s consent or, in
the absence of the settlor’s consent, only if the termination would not frustrate a

177

See Ogus, supra note __, at 214.

See generally Alexander, supra note __, at 1254-64; Hirsch & William, supra note __; Ronald Chester, Inheritance, Wealth and Society passim (1982); Po sner, supra note __, at § 18.3, pp. 518-20; Gareth
H. Jones, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts, in Edward C. Halbach, Jr., ed., Death, Taxes and
Family Property 119 (1977).
178

See Lawrence W. Waggoner, et. al., Family Property Law 900 (3d ed. 2002). See also Sterk, RAP,
supra, note __; Note, Dynasty Trusts, supra note __; Dobris, supra note __; Vallario, supra note __; Jesse
Dukeminier, Dynasty Trusts: Sheltering Descendants from Transfer Taxes, 23 Est. Plan. 417 (1996).
An interesting question is whether private trus ts might soon face the sort of dead-hand problems that
are familiar in charitable trusts as the latter have long been exempt from the rule against perpetuities.
See generally Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Limiting Dead Hand Control of Charitable Trusts: Expan ding the
Use of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 21 U. Hawaii L. Rev. 353, 356 (1999); Po sner, supra note __, at § 18.4, p.
520; Macey, supra note __.
179

Cf. II Scott on Trusts § 107.3, p. 125. Note, however, that the relevant considerations for modific ation versus termination are not entirely the same. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 65 cmt. f. This
follows from, among other things, the observation that in practice termination often pits the current
against the remainder beneficiaries whereas modification more commonly touches only the
settlor/beneficiary tension.
180

181

20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889). See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 65 cmt. a.
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“material purpose” of the trust.182 Settlor’s consent, however, is by definition
unavailable for the modification of a testamentary trust, and anyway courts
have had little difficulty in finding a “material purpose” that would be offended
by a modification or termination.183 So as a practical matter, unless the trustee
consents, 184 American trusts are difficult to amend or terminate once established. Indeed, even if all the competent beneficiaries and the trustee were inclined to strike a deal, the frequency of unidentified or minor beneficiaries reduces the viability of this alternative.185
The upshot of the Claflin doctrine is that it helps align the interests of
the settlor and the trustee. The rule allows the trustee to preserve the settlor’s
original design, regardless of wishes of the beneficiaries, which in the usual case
is what the settlor would have wanted. The settlor, after all, chose a trust
rather than another form of organization or an outright transfer, 186 so the
Claflin doctrine is consistent with the model of the settlor as the primary principal. Moreover, even though a particular beneficiary might prefer the power to
cause the termination of the trust if asked ex post, in the aggregate potential
beneficiaries may do better ex ante with the Claflin doctrine. The assurance
provided by the Claflin doctrine (i.e., the reduction in settlor/trustee agency
costs that it facilitates) should increase the willingness of grantors to create a
trust in the first place.187 The justification appears to be that beneficiaries as a
class do better with more trusts (and so more gifting188), albeit with potentially
greater managerial agency costs, than with fewer trusts with a reduced potential for managerial agency costs.
On the other hand, the downside of the rule is that it entrenches the
trustee and locks in a certain minimal level of beneficiary/trustee agency costs.
Under the classic American approach, even if all of the beneficiaries are identifiable adults who would be better off if the trust were terminated (perhaps beSee Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 65 & cmt. a; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 337; IV Scott on
Trusts §§ 337-340.2.
182

See generally IV Scott on Trusts §§ 337.1-337.8. For a specific example, see In re Estate of Brown,
528 A.2d 752, 755 (Vt. 1987) (“We believe that the settlor’s intention to assure a life-long income to
Woolson and Rosemary Brown would be defeated if termination were allowed.”).
183

See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 342; IV Scott on Trusts § 342, pp. 529-32; Roger W. Andersen,
Understanding Trusts and Estates 110-111 (3d ed. 2003).
184

185

Cf. IV Scott on Trusts § 342, p. 532.

Cf. Langbein, supra note __, at 632 (“The donor who structures a gift in this way expects compensating advantages.”).
186

That the trust is less easily modified than a contract might help solve the so -called Samaritan’s dilemma, see Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms __ (2000), by binding all to the ex ante deal. See Ogus,
supra note __, at 189. The idea is that if S is willing to transfer resources to B but B anticipates that S
will do so, then B will behave more recklessly because he know that S will be providing a safety net.
187

The further assumption here is that the overall volume of gifting would fall because in the absence of
these rules some grantors would prefer not to make a transfer at all. If the level of overall gifting remained constant, however, then beneficiaries might do better without the rule, provided that the alte rnative modes of transfer imposed fewer restrictions. But with fewer restrictions, these alternatives
would be imperfect substitutes, so it is unlikely that the overall level of gifting would remain constant.
188
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cause its consequent administrative expenses would be eliminated), the trustee
need not assent to their wishes. Against the Claflin doctrine, therefore, it might
be argued that the fundamental decision whether or not to continue the trust is
not in the hands of those who bear the marginal costs and benefits of that decision.
True, at its most extreme this is just to say that the beneficiaries cannot
override the settlor’s choice of form; and the American rule appears to represent
the judgment that all the relevant parties do better in the aggregate by allowing
settlors to bind the residual claimants to the trust form of organization. But if
one starts from the premise that ultimately settlors of today’s managerial trusts
would want to maximize the welfare of the beneficiaries, then it might well be
that a different rule is preferable, especially in view of the ongoing erosion of the
rule against perpetuities.189 On this view, one-time settlors don’t know to opt
out of the default Claflin regime and their advisors are failing to call this to
their attention (the latter being a manifestation of a different agency problem).
Thus, it should not be a surprise that there is a strong academic and
slowly emerging decisional trend towards liberalizing these rules.190 As in the
classic (if then extraordinary) Pulitzer case, courts are beginning to show a willingness to authorize deviation from the settlor’s administrative or other instructions that, ove r time, are shown to conflict with the settlor’s assumed larger aim
of benefiting the beneficiaries.191 Certainly the new Uniform Trust Code and the
new Third Restatement of Trusts embrace this view,192 and in fact they extend it
to the power of “equitable deviation.” The idea behind equitable deviation is
that courts should permit modification of even the dispositive instructions of the
trust instrument in view of changed circumstances not anticipated by the
settlor.193 Related, there is burgeoning authority, perfectly sensible from an

189

See supra note 179 and text accompanying.

See, e.g., Halbach, supra note __, at 1899-1901; Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Significant Trends in the
Trust Law of the United States, 32 Vand. J. Trans. L. 531, 538 (1999); Cal. Prob. Code § 15409. See also
Ronald Chester, Modification and Termination of Trusts in the 21st Century: The Uniform Trust Code
Leads a Quiet Revolution, 35 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 697 (2001); Gail Boreman Bird, Trust Termin ation: Unborn, Living, and Dead Hands—Too Many Fingers in the Trust Pie , 36 Hastings L. J. 564
(1985).
190

Matter of Pulitzer, 249 N.Y.S. 87 (Surr. Ct. 1931), aff’d mem., 260 N.Y.S. 975 (App. Div. 1932). See
e.g., Carnahan v. Johnson, 711 N.E.2d 1093 (Ohio App. 1998); In re Mayo, 105 N.W.2d 900 (Minn.
1960); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 66 Reporter’s Notes to cmt. b (collecting illustrative authority).
For further discussion of Pulitzer, see Langbein, manuscript su pra note __, at 22-24.
191

See UTC §§ 410-12; Restatement (Third) of Trusts §§ 65-66; David M. English, The Uniform Trust
Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 Mo. L. Rev. 143, 169-176 (2002); Chester, supra note __, at 724-28; Julia C. Walker, Note, Get Your Dead Hands Off Me: Beneficiaries’ Right to
Terminate or Modify a Trust Under the Uniform Trust Code , 67 Mo. L. Rev. 443 (2002); English, supra
note __, at 27-28.
192

See Halbach, supra note __, at 1900-01; UTC § 412; Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 66. Cf. Peter J.
Wiedenbeck, Missouri’s Repeal of the Claflin Doctrine—New View of the Po licy Against Perpetuities?,
50 Mo. L. Rev. 805 (1985); Paul G. Haskell, Justifying the Principle of Distributive Deviation in the Law
of Trusts, 18 Has tings LJ. 267, 294 (1967); N.Y. Est. Pow. & Tr. L. § 7- 1.6(b).
193
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agency-costs contractarian perspective, for trust modifications made desirable
by tax exigencies that arise after the trust has been settled.194
Note, however, that all of these liberalizations are designed to advance
the settlors’ probable intent.195 If at the time of the trust’s creation a particular
tax savings was not possible, the reasonable assumption is that the settlor
would want the trust later modified to minimize taxes in light of subsequent
changes to the tax law.196 Similarly, the average settlor would want the court to
modify even the distributive provisions of the trust if, thanks to unanticipated
circumstances, the settlor’s prior regime is no longer sensible.197 To return to
our exemplary trust, settled by S for the benefit of B1 and B2, the supposition is
that S would have preferred to favor B2 over B1 if subsequently the former was
disabled in an accident while the business of the latter proved unusually successful.198 So all of these liberalizations, if understood as designed to effect a
substituted judgment for what the settlor would have wanted, are consistent
with a model of the trust in which the settlor is the primary principal. These
liberalizing trends give the beneficiaries what they want, but only when doing
so would approximate what the settlor would have wanted. They add the nuance of standards, as it were, to the otherwise blunderbuss Claflin rule.
The more liberal English approach, in contrast, reflects a rather different
dead-hand calculus. To begin with, the leading English case on the question of
premature termination, Saunders v. Vautier,199 reaches the opposite result from
Claflin. 200 Thus the answer in England to the question of whether all the
beneficiaries, if they are identifiable adults, can force the premature
termination of a trust over the dissent of the trustee is yes.201 Indeed, owing not
only to Saunders but even more clearly to the Variation of Trusts Act of 1958,202
See Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 12.2 & Reporter’s Note
(stating the rule and collecting authority); UTC § 416; IIA Scott on Trusts § 167, p. 281 n. 27 & 2001
Supplement at 306-11 (collecting authority); Halbach, supra note __, at 1887. Cf. Mary Louise Fellows,
In Search of Donative Intent, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 611 (1988).
194

195

See Langbein, supra note __, at 68-69.

The qualification allows for the scenario in which the settlor opts for a less tax-efficient trust in order
to maintain more control, for example the use of a nonexempt generation-skipping trust.
196

These liberalizations are therefore importantly different from reformation (which the English call
rectification of documents in equity). See generally Langbein, supra note __, at 69. Reformation conforms the document to what was actually intended at the time of execution. The innovation here is the
extension of the concept to testamentary trusts. See Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other
Donative Transfers § 12.1; UTC § 415. See, e.g., Pond v. Pond, 678 N.E.2d 1321 (Mass. 1997).
197

For an example of the traditional, contrary approach, see In re Trust of Stuchell, 801 P.2d 852 (Or.
1990) (refusing to modify a trust so as to preserve a di sabled beneficiary’s eligibility for public assi stance on the ground that the modification’s “only purpose . . . [was] to make the trust more advantageous to the beneficiaries”). But see Macey, surpa note __, at 300-02 (defending narrower interpretations of settlor’s intent).
198

49 Eng. Rep. 282 (1841). See also Goulding v. James, [1997] 2 All ER 239, 247 (“The principle reconises the rights of beneficiaries, who are sui juris and together entitled to the trust property, to exercise
their proprietary rights to over bear and defeat the intention of a testator or settlor to subject property
to the continuing trusts, powers and limitations of a will or trust instrument.”).
199

200

For a historical discussion, see Alexander, supra note __, at 1200-04.

201

See D.J. Hayton, The Law of Trusts 93- 96 (3d ed. 1998); Moffat, supra note __, at 248-52.
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ders but even more clearly to the Variation of Trusts Act of 1958,202 English law
resolves significantly more of the settlor/beneficiary tension on questions of
trust modification in favor of the beneficiaries.203 Unlike the recent liberalizations to American trust law, in England the question of what the settlor would
have wanted has little bearing on the resolution of these questions.204
In the English trust, therefore, the settlor is not the primary principal
and the settlor’s interests are subordinated to the goal of minimizing managerial agency costs ex post. “[A]fter the settlor’s death, the trust is regarded as the
beneficiaries’ property, not the settlor’s property—and the dead hand continues
to rule only by the sufferance of the beneficiaries.”205 A powerful criticism of this
approach, at least since the 1958 Act, is that it is mandatory. English settlors
cannot opt for the American or any other more restrictive approach. The Claflin
doctrine, however, is default, so American settlors can choose instead the English or any other more permissive regime. Put differently, an American trust
can be made to resemble an English one but English trusts cannot be made to
resemble an American one.
2. Trustee removal. A second and more specific example of the potential
tension between the interests of the settlor and the interests of the beneficiaries
concerns the question of on what grounds the beneficiaries may obtain the removal of the trustee. Yet again to return to our exe mplary trust, settled by S for
the benefit of B1 and B2 with T as trustee, the question is when if ever can B1
and/or B2 replace T.
On the one hand, settlors select trustees among other reasons because of
the trustees’ expected fidelity to the wishes of the settlor in the future e xercise of
discretion. On the other hand, it is the beneficiaries who as residual claimants
bear the marginal costs and benefits of the trustee’s decisions. Hence the beneficiaries have an incentive to monitor the performance of the trustee, and anyway under standard doctrine only the beneficiaries have standing to bring an
action against the trustee for breach of trust.206 The difficulty, then, is setting
the threshold for removal of the trustee high enough so that the trustee has
room to carry out the settlors’ wishes (including the protection of future beneficiaries) in the teeth of a contrary preference of the current beneficiaries without
6 & 7 Eliz. 2, ch. 53, § 1. Well-drafted instruments can easily circumvent Saunders, for example by
ensuring the existence of contingent interests. The 1958 Act, however, is indeed mandatory and it allows for the variation ex post of even discretionary trusts. For general discussion and references, see
Moffat, supra note __, at 253-72.
202

See Ogus, supra note __, at 202-04; Hayton, supra note __, at 174; Moffat, supra note __, at 248-73;
Pearce & Stevens, supra note __, at 423-38; Hayton, supra note __, at 598-600; Jones, supra note __, at
124-26. See generally Chester, supra note __, at 709-22. Canada is similarly more liberal. See Keith B.
Farquhar, Recent Themes in the Var iation of Trusts, 20 Est. Tr. & Pens. J. 181 (2001).
203

See Farquhar, supra note __, at 186-91; Moffat, supra note __, at 248-86. See also Wiede nbeck, supra
note __; Ogus, supra note __, at 202.
204

205

Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note __, at 651. See also Jo nes, supra note __, at 119-20.

206

See infra Part III.C.3.

- 34 -

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2003

37

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 13 [2003]

An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law

setting it so high as in effect to sanction shirking or mismanagement. In other
words, the goal is to minimize trustee/beneficiary agency costs subject to the ex
ante constraints imposed by the settlor.
The law’s default approach is to authorize courts to sack trustees who are
shown generally to be dishonest or who are shown specifically to have engaged
in a “serious breach of trust,” but not necessarily to remove trustees for breaches
that are not “serious” or to remove trustees for mere “friction.”207 Trustees who
were chosen by the settlor as compared to those named by a third party or a
court are even less readily removed—there is something of a thumb on the scale
for them.208 Thus, if the settlor was aware of an asserted ground for removal at
the time of naming the trustee, that ground will not serve as a basis for the later
removal of the trustee unless the trustee is “entirely” unfit to serve.209
These default rules appear to reflect the bargain to which the settlor and
trustee would have agreed when trusts were used predominately for the preservation of family land and the typical trustee was an amateur rather than a feepaid professional. When the trustee’s mission was simply to hold onto ancestral
land, there were fewer opportunities for beneficiary/trustee conflict (with less to
do, shirking is less of a problem). And in the aggregate, beneficiaries do better
when settlors are comfortable establishing trusts if the alternative is that
settlors wouldn’t make the transfer at all. So the traditionally high threshold
for sacking a trustee serviced the interests of the settlor while imposing a tolerable level of agency costs on the beneficiaries.
Today, however, modern prudent investor standards allow for greater discretion in portfolio management and the default overarching aim is to maximize
total return. This is related to the apparent trend towards professional trustees
(which suggests a weakened personal link between the settlor and the trustee);210 it is a component of the larger trend towards the use of the trust as an
organizing device for the professional management of financial assets; and with
these changes trust fiduciary law has replaced limited powers as the chief protection for beneficiaries.211 All of this is to say that, in view of the rise of the
modern managerial trust, the potential for agency costs in the
trustee/beneficiary relationship has increased. Thus, the importance of removal
as a check on these agency costs has likewise increased.

See, e.g., II Scott on Trusts at § 107, pp. 108-09; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 107 cmts. b-c;
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 37 cmt. e(1).
207

See, e.g., II Scott on Trusts at § 107.1, pp. 117-18; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 107 cmt. f;
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 37 cmt. f. Cf. English, supra note __, at 197-199 (discussing situations
“where the personal link between the settlor and trustee has been broken”).
208

See, e.g., II Scott on Trusts at § 107.1, p. 118; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 107 cmt. g; Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 37 cmt. f.
209

210

See note 55 and text accompanying.

See generally Langbein, supra note __, at 638-43; Langbe in, supra note __, at 71. See also Alexander, supra note __, at 775-76; Jones, supra note __, at 121-23.
211
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Consistent with this analysis, anecdotal evidence suggests that settlors
today regularly contract out of the default removal rules in favor of easier substitution of trustees,212 sometimes even authorizing a third-party (so-called trust
“protectors,” who will be discussed later) to exercise the power to replace a trustee.213 Consider also the analogy to the robust econometric evidence regarding
the negative impact on shareholder welfare of corporate takeover defenses such
as classified boards.214 This, too, lends support to the view that reducing the
threshold for the remo val of trustees should improve beneficiary welfare (putting to the side the effect of deterring the settling of trusts in the first place).
The foregoing is therefore an argument in favor of the somewhat more
liberal removal standards embraced by the new Uniform Trust Code and Restatement (Third) of Trusts.215 The argument is particularly strong with respect
to removal of large (as compared to boutique) institutional fiduciaries.216 Unlike
an individual with whom the settlor might have had a personal link, one institutional fiduciary is unlikely to have a comparative advantage over another in effecting the settlor’s intent, especially after a corporate reorganization and/or
turnover in the company’s staff of account managers.217 Of course, this is not to
suggest that reputational concerns, especially for large banks and trust comp anies, won’t militate towards fidelity. Rather the point is that making it easier
(at least as a default matter) for the beneficiaries to substitute one institution
for another might help create an ex post competition between institutional fiduciaries for trust control, as it were, to go along with the current ex ante competition for selection by the settlor.218

See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 34 cmt. c (“It is also common for the terms of trusts to provide for the appointment of new trustees.”); John R. Price, Price on Contemporary Estate Planning §
10.41, p. 1152 (2d ed. 2000); American Jurisprudence, Legal Forms—Trusts §§ 251:370–251:373,
251:388 (2d ed. 2001); Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners, Standard Provisions § 13 (1997). This
discussion puts to one side the doctrinal question of when this might cause the trustee to be deemed an
agent, legally defined, of the beneficiaries, thereby triggering consequences that the settlor probably
would not have intended. See Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 14, cmt. c, 14B, cmt. c.
212

213

See infra Part IV.B.4.

See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV, & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitak eover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Po licy, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887 (2002); Robert
Daines, Do Classified Boards Affect Firm Value? Takeover Defenses After the Po ison Pill (manuscript
on file with the author).
214

See UTC § 706; English, supra note __, at 197-99; Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 37 & cmt. e; Langbein, supra note __, at 75-76 (noting that the UTC “responds to the concern that under traditional law
beneficiaries have had little recourse when trustee performance has been indifferent, but not so egregious as to be in breach of trust”); English, supra note __, at 28.
215

See Ronald Chester & Sarah Reid Ziomek, Removal of Corporate Trustees Under the Uniform Trust
Code and Other Current Law: Does a Contractual Lens Help Clarify the Rights of Beneficiar ies?, 67 Mo.
L. Rev. 241, 253-56 (2002).
216

See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 37 cmt. f (“[D]eference . . . may no longer be justified if, after
being designated, a corporate trustee undergoes a significant structural change, such as by merger.”);
Chester & Ziomek, supra note __. See also Price, supra note __, at § 10.43.1, p. 1161-62.
217

Cf. Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note __, at 661. It should be noted, however, that a cost of this
approach is further burdening the fiduciary apparatus that protects future beneficiaries from excessive
favoring of the current beneficiaries. See supra Part IV.A.1.
218
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3. Settlor standing. A further example of the settlor/beneficiary tension
is the question of settlor standing to enforce the terms of the trust. The traditional rule is that in an irrevocable trust only the beneficiaries have standing to
bring an action for breach of trust.219 On first glance this follows naturally from
the position of the beneficiaries as the residual claimants, and it mirrors the
similar approach in other organizational forms, most obviously the corporation.220 Once the trust has been established, the settlor, like anyone else who is
not a beneficiary, has no tangible stake in enforcing its terms. The beneficiaries, in contrast, bear the marginal costs and benefits of the trustees’ decision
making. So it is the beneficiaries who have an incentive to bring litigation only
when cost-justified, at least so far as they are identified and their stake is large
enough to counter the collective action problem.221
But this analysis is too simple. Indeed, against this Langbein suggests
that most settlors would prefer to retain the ability to bring enforcement actions
against the trustee. Thus Langbein argues that the underlying default rule
should be reversed so that it would imply settlor standing in the absence of a
contrary instruction in the trust instrument.222 There are, however, two additional relevant considerations, the second of which is more clearly brought into
view by the agency-costs approach and its nexus of contracts analogy.
First, because of an exogenous tax consideration, this is a que stion on
which evidence of the actual bargains struck by settlors is not necessarily indicative of their preferences. Under current doctrine, in order to have standing
to sue, the settlor must retain some sort of beneficial interest in the trust.223
But doing so would likely subject the trust to undesirable tax consequences.224
This means that the general failure by settlors to retain standing rights is not
good evidence of their preferences. More concretely, this failure is not good eviSee Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 200; III Scott on Trusts §§ 200-200.1, pp. 207-12. See generally
John T. Gaubatz, Grantor Enforcement of Trusts: Standing in One Private Law Setting, 62 N. C. L.
Rev. 905 (1984); Note, Right of a Settlor to Enforce a Private Trust, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1370 (1949).
219

See Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders
the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 23 (1991); Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note __, at 37-38; Bainbridge, supra note __, at § 9.2, pp. 410- 17. In both corporate and
trust litigation any recovery from the fiduciary will be owed either to the plaintiff or to the
trust/corporation depending on the nature of the breach.
220

221

See Gordon, supra note __, at 76-79.

Langbein, supra note __, at 664-65. See also Hayton, supra note __, at 103. A similar analysis
might apply to the question of whether the settlor of an inter vivos trust has the power to revoke or to
amend the trust in the absence of express authority in the trust instrument to do so. See Halbach, supra note __, at 1898-99; UTC § 602; Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 63; Langbein, su pra note __, at 7071. There is also overlap with the question of standing under the Uniform Management of Institutional
Funds Act (“UMIFA”), see, e.g., Yale University v. Blumentahl, 621 A.2d 1304 (1993), which is currently
being revised.
222

223

See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 200 cmt. b; III Scott on Trusts § 200.1, p. 212.

See generally George T. Bogert, Trusts § 145, p. 516 (6th ed. 1987). In correspondence with the author, Joel Dobris helpfully suggested that another way to look at the question is to ask whether a narrowly crafted power to enforce state law fiduciary duties would qua lify as a string under IRC §§ 2036
and 2038.
224
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dence that the increased trustee commissions that such standing would prompt
has deterred settlors from retaining a beneficial interest. The proliferation of
the trust “protector,” which will be discussed below, is in fact evidence to the
contrary.
Second, the agency cost implications of the recognition of settlor standing
are not as obvious as suggested at the outset of this subsection. True, it is possible that settlor standing would increase agency costs by introducing a second
master, as it were, over the trustee. “A manager told to serve two masters . . .
has been freed of both and is answerable to neither.”225 This is the usual argument in the corporate law discourse against allowing managers to justify their
decisions by reference to the welfare of any constituency other than shareholders.226 And this objection might have particular salience in the trust context,
because the fear of litigation on these alternate fronts might further inhibit already overly cautious trustees. After all, an important rationale for the recent
changes to the standards of prudent investing was to encourage trustees to be
less conservative.227
On the other hand, the donative settlor’s motivation for interposing a
trustee between the trust assets and the beneficiary, tax exigencies to one side,
is often a lack of faith in the beneficiaries’ judgment. Given the likelihood of
feckless, unborn, minor, unidentifiable, or otherwise incompetent beneficiaries,228 and further given the possibility of a free-rider problem among the beneficiaries,229 settlor standing might minimize agency costs by making more viable
the threat of litigation as a deterrent against actions by the trustee that are not
in the best interests of the beneficiaries or are but breach a contrary instruction
of the settlor. Many trust beneficiaries, as has been noted elsewhere, are not
particularly effective monitors,230 and even when they are, their preferences are
not necessarily congruent with the settlor’s.
The further contribution of the foregoing agency costs analysis to Langbein’s discussion is to highlight the importance of the que stions of whose claim
the settlor would be permitted to advance and whether the settlor’s approval of
an action would insulate the trustee from a later action by the beneficiaries (or
225

Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note __, at 38.

226

See, e.g., Macey, supra note __, at 31-36; Bainbridge, supra note __, at § 9.2, pp. 414-18.

227

See, e.g., Langbein, supra note __; Halbach, supra note __.

The doctrine of virtual representation and the appointment of a guardian ad litem are at best partial
solutions. Guardians ad litem are often highly inflexible, see, e.g., Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo,
Rosen & Heilbronner, 612 So. 2d 1378, 1379 n. 1 (Fla. 1993); see also UPC § 1-403; UTC § 305; Martin
D. Beglieter, The Guardian Ad Litem in Estate Proceedings, 20 Willamette L. Rev. 643 (1984), and the
doctrine of virtual representation requires an alignment of inte rests across generations. See, e.g., UPC
1-403; N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act § 315; UTC § 304; In re Wolcott, 56 A.2d 641 (N.H. 1948); Lawrence B.
Rodman & Leroy E. Rodman, Virtual Representation: Some Possible Extensions, 6 Real Prop. Prob. &
Tr. J. 281 (1971). See generally Valerie J. Vollmar, Amy Morris Hess, & Robert Whitman, An Introdu ction to Trusts and Estates 345-46 (2003).
228

229
230

See infra Part IV.D.1.
See, e.g., Fischel & Langbein, supra note __, at 1114-15, 1118-19; Gordon, supra note __, at 82.
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the beneficiaries’ guardian ad litem).231 This question is a specific manifestation
of the larger issue of determining who is the trustee’s dominant principal, the
settlor or the beneficiaries. If the aim of trust law were to maximize the welfare
of the beneficiaries, without more, then settlor standing should be qualified so
as to require that any claim brought by the settlor be resolved from the perspective of the beneficiaries. But our model of the trust is one in which the trustee is
to maximize the welfare of the beneficiaries subject to the initial constraints of
the settlor. Thus, the recognition of settlor standing could reduce two very different types of agency costs.
First, again returning to our exemplary trust settled by S for the benefit
of B1 and B2, T is more likely to act appropriately if not only B1 and B2 have
standing to sue, but so did S. Here S’s standing would provide a backstop check
on managerial agency costs. Second, T is less likely to enter into a side bargain
with the Bs to avoid the ex ante constraints imposed by S if S had standing to
sue. For example, the Bs might otherwise offer to pay T to disburse the corpus
of the trust, and there would be no duty of loyalty problem if all the Bs were
competent adults who signed on to the deal.232 In this scenario S’s standing
would help ensure that T r espects S’s limitations on the use of the trust’s funds.
Given the lack of identifiable beneficiaries in charitable trusts, the foregoing analysis may be relevant to the ongoing debate over settlor standing in
that context as well.233
4. Trust protectors. An emerging feature of modern managerial trusts is
the appointment of a so-called trust “protector.”234 To return yet again to our
exemplary trust, which was settled by S for the benefit of B1 and B2 with T as
the trustee, S might also name his trusted friend P as the trust “protector,” frequently an uncompensated position. Among other things P might be granted
the authority to replace T, to approve modifications to the trust in view of deve lopments in the tax law or changes in the Bs’ welfare, and otherwise to make the
sort of decisions with respect to the trust’s management that S would have made

231

For a complementary doctrin al analysis, see Hayton, supra note __, at 103-04.

232

See supra notes 184-185 and text accompanying.

See UTC § 405(c); Ronald Chester, Grantor Standing to Enforce Charitable Transfers Under Section
405(C) of the Uniform Trust Code and Related Law: How Important is it and How Exte nsive Should it
be?, 37 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 611, 628-29 (2003); English, supra note __, at 180; Paula Kilcoyne, Donor Standing Under the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act in Light of Carl J. Herzog
Foundation, Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 21 West. N. Eng. L. Rev. 131 (1999). See also Geoffrey A.
Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999 Wisc. L. Rev. 227; Symposium Issue on the Bishop Estate Controversy, 21 U. Hawaii L. Rev. 353-714 (1999); Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law , 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 497, 606-15 (1981); UTC § 405 & cmt.;
Ilana H. Eisenstein, Note, Keeping Charity in Charitable Trust Law: The Barnes Foundation and the
Case for Consideration of Public Interest in Administration of Charitable Trusts, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1747 (2003).
233

See Reporter’s Notes to Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 64 cmts. b-d ; Hayton, supra note __, at 579.
See also SD ST § 55-1B-1(2); UTC § 808(c) & cmt.
234
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had S been able to do so.235 Originally conceived as a check on local trustees in
offshore asset-protection trusts—not surprisingly, offshore jurisdictions typically
require the appointment of a lo cal trustee and anyway doing so is critical to
avoiding in rem jurisdiction by mainland courts236—the trust protector has today migrated into ordinary trusts. This migration is unsurprising in light of the
protector’s usefulness in minimizing agency costs.
Putting to one side the doctrinal question of when, if ever, protectors
should be held to be fiduciaries with respect to the beneficiaries,237 the ability of
the protector to check agency costs is relatively straightforward. An office of
trust protector allows the settlor to appoint a trusted friend or confidant to
monitor the trustee’s management. Thus, for all the reasons noted in the prior
subsection that settlor standing might reduce agency costs, the appointment of a
trust protector might similarly reduce agency costs. But it has the further advantages of avoiding the tax consequences of settlor standing and it continues to
function even after the settlor’s death.
True, such an appointment opens the door to new sources of agency
costs—the settlor/protector relationship as well as the beneficiaries/protector
relationship. But these costs are likely to be swamped by the reduction in
agency costs overall. By giving the protector authority, say, to replace the trustee, but not appointing the protector to be the trustee, the settlor is freed to appoint a trusted and loyal friend as the trust protector even if this friend othe rwise lacks the administrative or portfolio management skills necessary himself
to be a good trustee or co-trustee.238 Moreover, by giving the protector the power
to select his or her successor, the office of the protector will continue to be occupied despite the erosion of the rule against perpetuities and the emergence of socalled perpetual trusts.
The more general point is that the emergence of trust protectors is a response to the settlor’s uncertainty about the future. Like powers of appointment,239 a trust protector can be used to build flexibility into a trust.

See, e.g., SD ST § 55-1B-6 (2002) (listing potential powers); Hayton, supra note __, at 583-84 (same).
See generally Donovan W. M. Waters, The Protector: New Wine in Old Bottles?, in A. J. Oakley, ed.,
Trends in Contemporary Trust Law 63 (1963); Antony Duckworth, Prote ctors—Fish or Fowl, Part I, 4 J.
Int’l Tr. & Corp. Plan. 131 (1995); Antony Duckworth, Protectors—Fish or Fowl, Part II, 5 J. Int’l Tr. &
Corp. Plan. 18 (1996); Paul Matthews, Protectors: Two Cases, Twenty Questions, 9 Tr. L. Int’l 108
(1995). See also Halbach, su pra note __, at 1916-17.
235

236

See Sitkoff & Corsico, supra note __.

On this question, which is beyond the scope of this paper, see, e.g., Reporter’s Notes to Restatement
(Third) of Trusts § 64 cmts. b- d (T.D. No. 3, approved 2001); Waters, supra note __.
237

The evolution of the protector might thus be understood as falling within the framework of Langbein’s predicted “fractionation of trusteeship.” Langbein, supra note __, at 665- 66.
238

See, e.g., George G. Bogert & George T. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 299 (rev. 2d ed.
1992).
239
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C. Internal Governance and External Authority
By including creditors within its scope, the agency costs model of the
trust as an organizational form helpfully highlights the interrelationship between internal governance and the scope of the authority of “insiders” to transact with “outsiders.” The key point is that the agency cost considerations relevant to the substantive content of the rules of internal trust governance are a
function of the scope of the external relations authority of the principal parties
to deal with outsiders; and similarly the e xtent to which the insiders to the trust
deal might safely be granted authority to transact over trust assets with outsiders is a function of the effectiveness of the internal governance structure.240
Hence, the agency costs approach to the trust advanced in this paper
should not be taken as an embrace of the sort of contractarian nihilism that
leads to the conclusion that organizations have no boundaries—in Jensen and
Meckling’s words, that “it makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those
things that are ‘inside’ the firm (or any other organization) from those things
that are ‘outside’ of it.”241 To the contrary, the point recognizes the existence of
boundaries and the crucial asset partitioning role of organizational law (i.e., the
de facto separate legal entity of the trust or its equivalent, the trustee as trustee). The claim is rather that the rules which govern the relations of the trust’s
“insiders” with “outsiders”—what Hansmann and Mattei refer to as trust law’s
“essential” asset partitioning function—a r e intertwined with the governance
mechanisms available to the insiders for regulating the external relations of
each other. So the claim of this section is that the rules of governance are intertwined with the rules of external relations. Any change in one will have a ripple
effect on the terms to which the relevant parties would have agreed concerning
the other. Accordingly, agency costs analysis of trust law speaks not only to
matters of both internal governance and external relations, but it also brings
into view the interrelationship between the two.
1. Equitable tracing. Perhaps the best example of this point is the principle of equitable tracing. Under standard doctrine, beneficiaries have the right
t o assert an equitable lien on property transferred by the trustee to a thirdparty in breach of trust, provided the transferee is not a bona fide purchaser for
value without notice.242 Fraudulent conveyance law to one side, one’s recourse
for a broken contract does not normally include a suit against the outsider who
benefited by the breach.243 So there is some tension here with notion of the trust
Thus, just as o ne would not study the rules of an agent’s (legally defined) authority to bind the principal without reference to the effectiveness of the governance devices provided by the law of agency (and
vice versa), so too the rules of the external relations of the principal parties with respect to the trust
property are related to the rules of internal trust governance (and vice versa).
240

241

Jensen & Meckling, supra note __, at 56-57.

See Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 283- 295; IV Scott on Trusts §§ 283-95; Kline v. Orebaugh, 519
P.2d 691, 696 (Kan. 1974).
242

This is an important premise for the notion of efficient breach. See, e.g., Posner, supra note __, at §
4.9, pp. 120-21. But see Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note __, at S412-13.
243
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as a third-party beneficiary contract. Langbein’s answer, in addition to concluding that the trust is in the end a hybrid of contract and property, 244 is to characterize the rule as embodying “a judgment about how far to impinge on outsiders
to the trust deal between the settlor and trustee in order to vindicate that
deal.”245
There is, in contrast, no tension between this point and the agency costs
model of the trust as an organizational form. By including those who deal with
the trustee within the relevant set or nexus of relationships, the rule of equitable tracing can be understood as reflecting the parties’ presumed intent in light
of the comparative advantage of the outsider over the beneficiary to bear the
agency costs associated with this particular potential breach by the trustee.
Thus, even though Hansmann & Mattei regard the default rules of internal
trust governance as “relatively unimportant” in comparison to the rules that
control the relations of the principle parties with outsiders,246 their explanation
of equitable tracing likewise acknowledges the interrelationship between external relations and internal governance. When “the rule [of equitable tracing] operates, the third party transferor is almost by definition a lower-cost monitor of
the [trustee’s] breach of duty than is the [beneficiary].”247 In other words, in the
absence of a contrary agreement, efficiency militates towards allocating this risk
to the outsider rather than increasing the burden on the trust’s internal governance devices. The outsider is the cheaper bearer of this risk.248
This sort of analysis not only provides a functional explanation for equitable tracing as a positive matter, but it also helps bring into view pertinent
normative considerations for modern trust law reform. Recognition of the interrelationship between internal governance and the scope of external relations
authority shows that the “price” for relaxing one is increasing the problems associated with the other. Thus, recognition of the tradeoff provides a straightforward means for ascertaining the costs and benefits of law reform on the margins of this que stion.
A concrete example is the trend towards liberalizing the rules that govern the dealings of the trustee, as trustee, with third parties.249 The foregoing
analysis suggests that the price, as it were, for enlarging the trustee’s transactional authority will be an increase in potential agency costs and so a greater
burden on the internal governance devices. Hence, when David English, the
Uniform Trust Code’s Reporter, suggests that “beneficiaries are helped more by
244

See supra note 42 and text accompanying.

245

Langbein, supra note __, at 647-48. See also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note __, at S378-79.

246

Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __, at 438. See supra note __ and text accompanying.

247

Id. at 464.

Cf. Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law:
An Economic Analysis, 6 J. Leg. Stud. 83 (1977).
248

UTC §§ 1010-13. These UTC provisions, which are based on similar provisions in the 1969 Uniform
Probate Code and Uniform Trustee Powers Act, are the culmination of a decades-long process of statutory reform. See supra note 11.
249
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the free flow of commerce than they were by the largely ineffective protective
features of former law,”250 he might be interpreted as suggesting that increasing
the value of property held in the trust’s default form by expanding the trustees’
transactional opportunities (the benefit of this reform) outweighs the minimal
increase in the burden on the existing governance devices (the cost of this reform).251
2. The spendthrift trust. A second example of the importance of the interrelationship between internal governance considerations and the scope of the
principal parties’ external relations authority may be found in the spendthrift
trust. Spendthrift trusts, in comparison to ordinary trusts without spendthrift
protection, shield the trusts’ assets from the beneficiaries’ creditors.252 This is
true even if the trust instrument requires mandatory payouts, because those
payments could be made directly to the beneficiaries’ service providers.253 Not
surprisingly, there is a substantial literature on the policy soundness of the
spendthrift trust.254 There is also considerable divergence among the common
law nations on their enforcement. Spendthrift provisions are valid in the
United States (indeed, they are the default in New York255), but they are not enforced in the majority of the common law world (including most prominently
England).256
The existing normative commentary on the spendthrift trust tends to
treat the question as presenting a tradeoff between paternalistic protection of
feckless beneficiaries and the protection of voluntary and, more clearly, involuntary creditors.257 Thus, the usual focus is on the policy soundness of limiting the
250

English, supra note __, at 208-11.

This is consistent with the move away from cabining trustees’ authority through limited powers and
towards the fiduciary principle as the trust’s chief governance device. See Langbein, supra note __, at
641-42; text accompanying supra notes __.
251

See generally Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 152-53; Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 58; UTC §
502. State law restrictions on transfer are applicable even in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). A few
privileged creditors, however, including children, spouses, and former spouses seeking support or maintenance, may sometimes reach the beneficiaries’ interest despite a spendthrift clause. See Restatement
(Third) of Trusts § 59; UTC § 503; Carolyn L. Dessin, Feed a Trust and Starve a Child: The Effectiv eness of Trust Protective Techniques Against Claims for Support and Alimony, 10 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 691,
699-723 (1994).
252

253

Cf. Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note __, at 647.

See, e.g., Alan Newman, The Rights of Creditors of Beneficiaries Under the Uniform Trust Code: An
Examination of the Compromise , 69 Tenn. L. Rev. 771 (2002); Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law
of Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 Hastings L. J. 287 (2002); Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and
Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspe ctives, 73 Wash. U. L.Q. 1 (1995); Anne S. Emanuel,
Spendthrift Trusts: It’s Time to Codify the Compromise , 72 Neb. L. Rev. 179 (1993); E rwin N. Griswold,
Spendthrift Trusts (1936); John Chipman Gray, Restraints on the Alienation of Property (1883). See
also Fellows, supra note __.
254

N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 7-1.5. Spendthrift clauses are standard in practitioner formbooks
and they are customary estate planning boilerplate. See Hirsch, su pra note __, at 3 & n. 7.
255

The classic English case is Brandon v. Robinson, 34 Eng. Rep. 379 (Ch. 1811). For further discussion
and references, see Moffat, supra note __, at 211-24.
256

See, e.g., Posner, supra note __, at § 18.7, p. 523-24; Hirsch, supra note __; Emanuel, supra note __;
Ogus, supra note __, at 217-18.
257
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scope of the beneficiaries’ external relations authority in view of how doing so
impacts both the beneficiaries and the outsiders with whom the beneficiaries
transact. This approach, however, overlooks the interrelationship between the
external relations of the trust insiders with third parties on the one hand and
the details of the internal governance regime on the other.258
One governance benefit of the enforcement of spendthrift provisions is
that the payouts in a spendthrift trust may safely be made mandatory. This reduces the trustee’s discretion and so diminishes the potential for managerial
agency costs. But the cost is that an alternative potential check on agency costs,
the theoretical possibility of the residual claimants’ exit, is foreclosed as a matter of law. Exit is in theory a powerful governance device, but its potential has
not been realized in the context of donative trusts.259 The idea is that the consequent market for residual interests would provide price signals on the quality of
the particular trust’s management. Unlike the initial gratuitous transfer by the
settlor, a subsequent sale by the beneficiary of his or her interest would indeed
involve reckoning a price.260
Moreover, open as compared to closed residual claims offer the possibility
of welfare-improving secondary transactions. For example, if in the hands of the
beneficiary the discounted present value of the future income stream from the
trust is worth $10, but in the hands of someone who is more adept at monitoring
and at fiduciary litigation the present value of the beneficiary’s interest would
be $15, a spendthrift provision results in a $5 residual loss. This is the agency
costs “price,” as it were, of honoring the settlor’s dead hand interest in protecting a hapless beneficiary.261
In the absence of spendthrift recognition, however, settlors who wish to
guard the trust’s assets against an insolvent beneficiary’s creditors would be
channeled, as they are in England,262 towards discretionary trusts.263 (DiscreThere is no reason to limit “third persons” in trust law parlance to those who deal with the trustee as
trustee. See, e.g., English, supra note __, at 208. Third persons al so deal with beneficiaries as benefic iaries. Cf. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __, at 451-53.
258

Exit is discussed here as a theoretical governance device, because as noted earlier, see text accompanying supra note 159, there is no well-developed market for American trust interests. Perhaps this is a
consequence of the frequency of spendthrift clauses, discretionary trusts, and protective provisions.
Indeed the availability of the latter two, on which see supra note 263 and text accompanying, also helps
explain the narrowness of the corresponding English market. The author thanks Richard Nolan for
discussion on this point.
259

See Jensen & Fama, supra note __, at 312-15; Fama, supra note __, at 292; Easte rbrook & Fischel,
supra note __, at 274-77. Cf. Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Birthrights Up for Auction as Investments in Lo ndon, N.Y. Times D1 (March 6, 1978). See also notes 113-116 and text accompanying.
260

The settlor, in other words, must have figured that the beneficiary would alienate his or her interest
for less than $10 if given the chance to do so. As Richard Posner has remarked, such “[t]rusts are based
on mistrust.” Posner, supra note __, at § 18.7, pp. 523-24.
261

262

See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note __, at 452 n. 57; Halbach, supra note __, at 1893.

See, e.g., UTC § 504; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 155; Evelyn Ginsberg Abravanel, Discretionary Support Trusts, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 273 (1983); Newman, supra note __, at 803-16. Yet another alternative, also common in England, see, e.g., Hayton, supra note __, at 590-92, is a trust with a “protective
263
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tionary trusts are common in American practice too, but American settlors who
are concerned about a beneficiary’s future insolvency have the spendthrift alternative.) By leaving the payment decision to the discretion of the trustee, the
beneficiary has no right to a payout, which means that neither does his or her
creditors.264 But the cost of this alternative disabling restraint is that the fiduciary obligation is further burdened with the task of regulating the trustees’ exercise of this discretion over disbursements. 265 Since the remedy for an
underpayment is merely an order that the payments be increased,266 but the
remedy for an overpayment is to surcharge the trustee personally for the excess
amounts disbursed,267 this skews trustees towards caution.268 What is more, interests in discretionary trusts are not easily saleable because there is no guarantee of future payments, so discretionary trusts, like spendthrifts, fail to allow
for exit.
These differing routes to giving effect to the settlor’s interest in cabining
the right of a beneficiary to alienate his or her interest in the trust—a mandatory trust with a spendthrift limitation versus a discretionary trust—have different agency costs consequences. Thus it is not obvious that disapproval of the
spendthrift trust either decreases agency costs or improves the lot of the beneficiaries’ creditors (though of course creditors of discretionary trust beneficiaries
have leverage that creditors of spendthrift trust beneficiaries lack). Pe rhaps the
divergence of opinion among the common law jurisdictions reflects this difficulty
in reckoning the magnitudes of the foregoing competing e ffects.
Even if it does not help resolve the policy question of which form of protective measure is preferable, agency costs analysis does help explain the continued existence of one or more of them in all the common law jurisdictions.
Without the option of at least one enforceable protective measure, settlors who
are concerned about a beneficiary’s future insolvency would be channeled towards informal arrangements such as outright transfers to trusted kin or
provision.” This is a clause that conditions the beneficiaries’ interest on his or her solvency or the nonoccurrence of any event that, but for the protective provision, the beneficiary’s interest would be reachable by a third party. See id.; Emanuel, supra note __, at 185-86; Ogus, supra note __, at 205; Bogert,
supra note __, at § 44; Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 57; Trustee Act 1925 § 33 (UK).
See, e.g., UTC § 504(b); Goforth v. Gee, 975 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Ky. 1998); United States v.
O’Shaughnessy, 517 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1994); Hamilton v. Drogo, 150 N.E. 496 (N.Y. 1926); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 155 & cmt. b; IIA Scott on Trusts § 155.1, pp. 159-64. But see Halbach, supra
note __, at 1895; Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 60 cmt. e.
264

See, e.g., Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Problems of Discretion in Discretionary Trusts, 61 Colum. L. Rev.
1425 (1961); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 50.
265

See Halbach, supra note __, at 1427; William M. McGovern, Jr. & Sheldon F. Kurtz, Wills, Trusts,
and Estates § 9.5, p. 339-40 (2001); Estate of Lindgren, 885 P.2d 1280, 1283 (Mont. 1994); Kolodney v.
Kolodney, 503 A.2d 625 (Conn. App. 1986).
266

See Halbach, supra note __, at 1427; McGovern & Kurtz, supra note __, at § 9.5, p. 339-40; Austin v.
U.S. Bank of Washington, 869 P.2d 404 (Wash. App. 1994); Feibelman v. Worthen Nat. Bank, 20 F.3d
835 (8th Cir. 1994); In re Murray, 45 A.2d 636 (Me. 1946).
267

A further though illegitimate reason for trustee conservatism is that their fees are often a pe rcentage
of the trust corpus, though this rules-based approach is now giving way to a “reasonableness” standard.
See supra note __.
268
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friends with a wink and nod that the transferee will take care of the would-be
beneficiary. 269 The potential agency costs to the beneficiaries and to the settlor
of this approach, which would hardly benefit the beneficiaries’ creditors, are
manifest.
D. Fiduciary Litigation
As we have seen, the possibility of market-based governance devices for
the private trust is cabined by the impediments, central to the donative trust’s
often paternalistic function, to the beneficiaries’ alienating their stake in the
trust and the difficulty in sacking the trustee. So in today’s managerial private
trusts, in which the limits of yore on the trustee’s authority have yielded to
broad grants of discretion, this places much of the governance burden on the fiduciary obligation.270 It is here, ho wever, that the agency costs approach to the
private trust most closely converges with Langbein’s contractarianism: both
point strongly towards a contractarian, hypothetical-bargain underpinning for
the fiduciary obligation.271 Indeed, drawing on earlier economic analyses of the
fiduciary relationship more generally, 272 Langbein persuasively shows that “pulpit-thumping rhetoric about the sanctity of fiduciary obligations” notwithstanding,273 the fiduciary duties imposed by the law of trusts are simply majoritarian
default rules.274

269

For further discussion and references, see Hirsch, supra note __, at 70-71.

See Langbein, supra note __, at 642 (discussing the decline of powers law and the rise of fiduc iary
law for protecting the interests of the beneficiaries).
270

There is no shortage of commentary on fiduciary duties generally. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note
__; William W. Bratton, Game Theory and the Restoration of Honor to Corporate Law’s Duty of Loyalty,
in Lawrence E. Mitchell, ed., Progressive Corporate Law (1995); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein,
Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 Wash. L. Rev 1 (1990);
Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties 55, in John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser,
eds., Principles and Agents: The Structure of Business 55 (1985); Brian R. Cheffins, Law, Economics
and Morality: Contracting Out of Corporate Law Fiduciary Duties, 19 Canadian Bus. L. J. 28 (1991);
Cooter & Freedman, supra note __; Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary
Obligation, 1988 Duke L. J. 879; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary
Duty, 36 J. L. & Econ. 425 (1993); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 Oregon L. Rev.
(1995); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law , 71 Cal. L. Rev 795 (1983); Oliver Hart, An Economist’s View of
Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. Toronto L. J. 199 (1993); Larry E. Ribstein, The Structure of the Fiduciary Relationship (manuscript); L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 Cambridge L. J. 69; J.C. Shepherd,
Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 L. Q. Rev. 51 (1981); D. Gordon Smith, The
Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1399 (2002); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 28 U. Toronto L. J. 1 (1975).
271

A point anticipated in Alexander, supra note __, at 1. See Langbein, supra note __, at 657- 60, citing
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note __; Cooter & Freedman, supra note __. See also Fischel & Langbein,
supra note __, at 1113-17.
272

Which is not to say that moral condemnation does not have utility as an expressive sanction, especially for institutional fiduciaries for whom reputation is a valuable asset. See Cooter & Freedman,
supra note __, at 1073-74; Langbein, supra note __, at 658.
273

“Loyalty and prudence, the norms of trust fiduciary law, embody the default regime that the parties
to the trust deal would choose as the criteria for regulating the trustee’s behavior in these settings in
which it is impractical to foresee precise circumstances and to specify more exact terms.” Langbein,
supra note __, at 629, 657-60.
274
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Thus, this section will not engage the debate over the contractarian basis
for trust fiduciary law. Nor will it explore the tightness of fit between the structure of the fiduciary obligation in trust law and the agency problems embedded
in the private trust (though there was some discussion of this earlier).275 Instead, this section will briefly explore two possible answers to the question of
why the fiduciary obligation appears to have succeeded as the private trust’s
chief check on agency costs.276 The question is brought into sharp relief by the
widely-held view that the fiduciary obligation has proved to be a less successful
governance device in the cognate field of corporate go vernance.277
1. Litigation incentives. When liability rules are the chief check on
agency costs, there is a practical limit to the number of residual claimants that
the organization can reasonably support. The greater the number, the more serious the collective action dynamic that will weaken any individual’s inventive
to monitor and then to bring litigation.278 Consider, for example, that the paradigmatic shareholder in a publicly-traded corporation has only a trivial stake in
the company. So he or she has little incentive to reckon the costs and benefits of
litigation from the perspective of all the shareholders. Consequently in corporate fiduciary litigation the real party in interest is often the lawyer.279
Litigation incentives are likely to be different, however, in the world of
private donative trusts thanks to the (typically) smaller number of residual
claimants.280 Donative trust beneficiaries are likely to have a nontrivial stake
when stake is measured by either the fraction of his or her wealth held in the
trust or the fractional share of the trust to which he or she is entitled. Accordingly, fiduciary litigation in trust law is more likely than in corporate law to be
prompted by the merits. That is, the relatively smaller number of residual
See supra Parts IV.A.1 (duty of impartiality) and IV.A.3 (duty of care). See also Sitkoff, supra note
__, at __ (duty of loyalty, duty of disclosure). For general discussion, see Cooter & Freedman, supra note
__, at 1047; W. Bishop & D.D. Prentice, Some Legal and Economic Aspects of Fiduciary Remuneration,
46 Mod. L. Rev. 289 (1983); Fischel & Langbein, su pra note __, at 1113-17.
275

276

For a behavioral decision theory approach to this question, see Alexander, supra note __.

See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litig ation Without Foundation?, 7 J. Law, Econ. & Org.
55 (1991); Reinier Kraakman, Hyun Park, & Steven Shavell, When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 Geo. L. J. 1733 (1994); Bradley & Fischel, supra note __; John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 L. & Contemp. Prob. 5
(1985); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation
and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 261 (1981); Bainbridge, supra note __, at § 8.3,
pp. 365-68. See also Sitkoff, supra note __ (comparing the governance of public corporations with that of
donative trusts).
277

278

See Gordon, supra note __, at 76-79.

See Bainbridge, supra note __, at § 8.3, p. 367; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note __, at 100- 02; Allen
& Kraakman, supra note __, at § 10.2, pp. 351-52, 355-56. See generally John C. Coffee, Understanding
the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through
Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669 (1986); Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, The
Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1991).
279

This point was noted in Macey, supra note __, at 319-20. See also Hirsch & Wang, supra note __, at
29 n. 110.
280
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claimants and their relatively larger stakes lessens the impact of the collective
action and free-rider dynamics.
This is not to say that the litigation incentives for trust beneficiaries are
perfect. Some beneficiaries lack a sufficient stake to reckon the costs and benefits of bringing litigation.281 What is more, awards of attorneys’ fees to one or
both sides in suits over trust administration are not uncommon.282 Even though
courts can use this as a tool to encourage meritorious litigation, the availability
of attorneys fees can also encourage strike suits.283 Still, the more modest claim
holds—fiduciary litigation is a viable governance option in trust law because
there are fewer residual claimants and the collective action pathology is thereby
minimized.
A separate objection might be that beneficiaries are often unsuited to
monitor the trustee, perhaps because they are unborn, incapacitated, or simply
irresponsible. After all, tax exigencies to one side, the settlor didn’t trust them
enough to make an outright transfer, favoring instead a trust despite its inhe rent agency costs. But trust fiduciary law, especially the duty of loyalty, is
stricter and more prophylactic than the fiduciary law of other organizational
forms.284 Hence, as Fischel and Langbein have suggested, many of trust law’s
fiduciary duties can be understood as “substitutes for monitoring by the directly
interested parties.”285 Moreover, the modern trend is towards expanding further
the duty of trustees to furnish beneficiaries with relevant information regarding
the management of the trust.286
At any rate, this analysis throws light on the relevance of the number of
residual claimants to the choice of organizational form.287 The agency costschecking mechanisms of the private trust depends on their being relatively
fewer. The corporation, in contrast, is constructed so that it can—but need not,
as shown by the success of the close corporation—handle many. Unlike the typical close corporation, the trust separates risk bearing and management; but

281

See Gordon, supra note __, at 76-79.

See, e.g., UTC § 1004 (court may award fees); III Scott on Trusts § 188.4 (trustees’ authority to pay
fees out of the trust corpus); Allard v. Pacific National Bank, 663 P.2d 104, 111-12 (Wash. 1983);
Gordon, supra note __, at 76-77 n. 103.
282

See generally Allen & Kraakman, supra note __, at § 10.2, pp. 351-52; Posner, supra note __, at §
21.11.
283

Consider, for example, the no-further-inquiry rule, on which see sources cited in infra note __. See
also supra Part IV.A.3 (comparison of the duty of care in trust law and corporate law).
284

Fischel & Langbein, supra note __, at 1114-15, 1118-19. Note the emergence of organizations such as
Heirs, Inc., the purpose of which is to facilitate better monitoring by trust beneficiaries. See
<http://www.heirs.net/>. See also Kathy Kristof, An Heir of Confidence, Chicago Trib. C7 (May 21,
1996).
285

See Halbach, supra note __, at 1914-15; UTC § 813. See also Allard v. Pacific National Bank, 663
P.2d 104, 110-111 (Wash. 1983); Langbein, supra note __, at 74; Langbein, manuscript, supra note __, at
Part II.C. For further discussion of disclosure in trust law, see Sitkoff, supra note __.
286

287

See generally Fama & Jensen, supra note __.
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unlike the public corporation, the trust’s residual claim is typically split among
a small number of claimants.288
The relevance of the number of residual claimants to the agency-costschecking utility of the fiduciary obligation is further emphasized by a quick
comparison of the private trust with the statutory business trust. The chief differences between the two are in the frequency with which business trusts provide voting rights, transferable or at least redeemable interests, and less rigo rous processes for removing trustees.289 Together, these characteristics make the
business trust look more like a public corporation than a donative private trust.
Likewise the governance of numerous commercial manifestations of the private
trust, at least when the residual claims are sold to outsiders, also more closely
resembles the governance of the public corporation than it does the donative
private trust.290 It will therefore be interesting to see whether the ongoing relaxation of the rule against perpetuities and its consequent increase in the
number of beneficiaries in donative trusts will eventually push trust law towards more of a corporate governance model.
It seems likely, moreover, that this agency costs analysis could be applied
to employee benefit and pension trusts, upon which ERISA imposes a mandatory trust law paradigm.291 Indeed, on first glance it appears that, given the
large number of participants in many of these plans, the incentive structure and
agency costs analysis for pension and employee benefits trusts might be more
like that of public corporations than the traditional gratuitous private trust.
This may explain some of the tension between the trust law paradigm and the
realities of pension and employee benefit trusts in practice.292
The relevance of the number of residual claimants to the agency costs
calculus is still further supported by the widely-held view that the absence of
In a loose sense, then, the trust is closer to the Alchian and Demsetz conception of the firm, with the
residual claimant as the chief monitor, Alchian & Demsetz, supra note __, at 782, than it is to the later
agency cost models of the public corporation, see, e.g., Fama, supra note __, at 289. But the trust is not
as close to Alchian and Demsetz’s model as the close corporation, for which the managers tend also to be
the chief residual claimants. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note __, at 273.
288
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290

291

ERISA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103; Langbein & Polk, supra note __, at 646-48.
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identifiable beneficiaries in charitable trusts raises serious governance problems.293
2. Fiduciary sub-rules. In other contexts, perhaps the most apposite being the governance of closely-held corporations, it has been suggested that the
“usefulness of fiduciary duties as a guide for conduct is limited” by their being so
open ended.294 But the private trust differs importantly from the close corporation in that there is less variance in the operating context from one trust to another. This relative homogeneity of context has allowed the law of trusts to
evolve a detailed schedule of fiduciary sub-rules as specific agency costschecking devices where law of close corporations depends instead on the parties’
cutting their own circumstances-specific deal.295 The fiduciary sub-rules of trust
law include the duties to keep and control trust property, to enforce claims, to
defend actions, to keep trust property separate, to minimize costs (including
taxes), to furnish information to the beneficiaries, and so on.296
The function of these sub-rules is to provide the benefits of rules (as compared to standards) without inviting strategic loop-holing by trustees.297 When
aggrieved beneficiaries can squeeze their claim into a specific sub-rule—and for
these purposes, the default ban on self-dealing known as the no -further-inquiry
rule can be included within this analysis298—their case is simplified. As in the
application of any rule, the costs of decision are lower than for a standard. But
when the aggrieved beneficiaries cannot squeeze their claim into a specific subrule, then the broad standards of care and loyalty serve as a backstop to allow
for contextual, facts-and-circumstances inquiry into the trustees’ behavior as a
part of the courts’ gap filling role owing to “the impossibility of writing contracts
completely specifying the parties’ obligations.”299 Recall that in the modern
managerial trust, the fiduciary obligation has eclipsed detailed schedules of limited powers as the chief device for controlling managerial agency costs.300 The
effectiveness of the trust law fiduciary obligation as a check on agency costs is
thus enhanced by use of a mix of sub-rules and overarching standards,301 the
293
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297
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former made possible by the relative homogeneity of managerial context for donative trusts.302
CONCLUSION
This paper’s agency costs approach to the donative private trust not only
helps illuminate the ongoing debate over whether trust law is closer to property
law or contract law, but more importantly it provides a rich positive and normative framework for further economic analysis of trust law. Principal-agent economics, in other words, has great potential to offer further insights about the
nature and function of the law of trusts. In particular, the agency costs analysis
of this paper demo nstrates how and why the use of the private trust triggers a
temporal agency problem (whether the trustee will remain loyal to the settlor’s
original wishes) in addition to the usual agency problem when risk-bearing and
management are separated (whether the trustee/manager will act in the best
interests of the beneficiaries/residual claimants).
The paper’s normative claim was that the law of private trusts should
minimize the agency costs inherent to locating managerial autho rity with the
trustee and the residual claim with the beneficiaries, but only to the extent that
doing so is consistent with the ex ante instructions of the settlor. This qualification gives priority to the settlor over the beneficiaries as the trustee’s primary
principal. The positive claim was that, at least with respect to traditional doctrines, the law of trusts conforms to the suggested normative approach. In particular, the paper demonstrated the power of the agency costs approach to offer
fresh insights by looking at recurring problem areas in trust law including,
among others, trust modification and termination, settlor standing, fiduciary
litigation, trust-investment law and the duty of impartiality, trustee removal,
the role of so-called trust “protectors,” and spendthrift trusts.

stood as manifestation of this sub-rule phenomenon. Cf. James R. McCall, Endangering Individual
Autonomy in Choice of Lawyers and Trustees—Misconceived Conflict of Interest Claims in the Kamehameha Schools Bishop Estate Litigation, 21 U. Hawaii L. Rev. 487, 488 n. 1 (1999).
On the relevance of ex ante programmability to agency costs analysis, see Eisenhardt, supra note __,
at 62.
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